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*Articles in this issue cover various aspects of the impact of Western ideas on the traditional societies of Islam, and Israel's relationship to the Islamic world. Our first author shows how "Exposure to Western ways and ideas . . . caused greater awareness of the mainsprings of Western superiority compared with the lands of Islam. Behind a Western cannon, frigate or steam engine, there was an engineer, a scientist or a naval architect, all products of a society which encouraged rationalism, science and independent inquiry." In an effort to adapt Islam to the modern world, revolutionary Arab leaders "In reality . . . have promoted a paradox expressed in the dualism of rationalism and irrationality."*

## Islam and the West in the Middle East

BY GEORGE LENCZOWSKI

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THE HISTORY OF relations between the West and the Middle East (defined as the area between the Eastern Mediterranean and the borders of India) has been one of almost continuous interaction of varying intensity from antiquity to the present day. This interaction has been sometimes violent, sometimes peaceful. Violence was generated by imperialism, practiced by the expansionist powers of both the East and the West at one time or another.

Expansion of the Persian Achaemenid Empire produced one of the early violent clashes of the East with the West, the latter personified by Greece. The West, in turn, extended its dominion over the East through the imperial ventures of Alexander the Great and Rome. While the Macedonian Empire became partly absorbed by those it had conquered, the Roman rule represented a purer form of Western penetration, more clearly contrasting with the East and more immune to its influences.

With the advent of Islam in the seventh

century, the East expanded again at the expense of the West: first, in a major wave of Arab conquests during the hundred years from 630 to 730 A.D.; second, in the three centuries of Ottoman onslaughts on Europe between 1389 (the defeat of Serbia at the battle of Kossovo) and 1683 (John Sobieski of Poland's victory over the Turks at the gates of Vienna).

Conquering armies invariably paved the way for the export and interchange of goods, ideas and men. This was never a one-way movement: the currents flowed in both directions and their breadth and depth depended on the inner resources and attractiveness of the civilization which generated them.

The ancient Middle East produced and exported three items which vitally influenced the destiny of mankind: an alphabetic script, a monotheistic religion and a concept of the supremacy of law. The Islamic East, in turn, gave the world the third great monotheistic faith and transmitted to the West—through discovery and translation—the legacy of

Greek thought in the fields of philosophy, mathematics, astronomy and medicine. It also developed forms of art and architecture which made an impact upon such far-flung areas as Spain and Muscovy. Islam's Persian variant added masterpieces of epic and lyric poetry, exquisite rug designs and refined miniature painting.

The Ottoman phase of Islamic expansion tended, on the whole, to be sterile in the export of goods and ideas. The Ottoman Empire was aptly described as an "army in occupation"<sup>1</sup> and as a community of shepherds, cattle and watchdogs, who transposed their original way of life in Central Asia into an imperial system of government. In this system, the conquering Turks were the shepherds, the conquered peoples the cattle ("rayah," meaning cattle or flocks, was the Turkish word for the subject Christian nationalities), while the slave-mercenary troops of foreign extraction (Janissaries) served as watchdogs over the subjects of the Empire.<sup>2</sup> This was an ingenious system of rule as long as the Turkish conquerors maintained their inner cohesion while securing from their Muslim subjects unquestioned acceptance of their Islamic legitimacy.

### POLITICAL CONCEPTS OF ISLAM

Both the theory and the practice of Islam favored the continuous supremacy of Otto-

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Naff, "Ottoman Diplomacy and the Great European Powers, 1789-1802," unpublished dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1960, p. 30. Quoted by David H. Finnie, *Pioneers East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 6-7.

<sup>2</sup> Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 171-178.

<sup>3</sup> For a fuller discussion of the Islamic theory of state, see Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955); Maurice Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Muslim Institutions* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1950), pp. 108ff.; H. A. R. Gibb, "Constitutional Organization," in M. Khadduri and H. J. Liebesny, eds., *Law in the Middle East* (Washington, D. C.: The Middle East Institute, 1955).

<sup>4</sup> On the Ottoman system of government, consult Albert H. Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (New York: Russell, 1913); H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950), Vol. I. Ch. III.

man caliphs over their multinational empire. Islamic political theory viewed the world as divided into the Domain of Islam and the Domain of the West with a state of permanent war, interrupted at the most by limited truces, between the two.<sup>3</sup>

The Domain of Islam comprised the community of believers (*umma*) led by the imam-caliph, who combined temporal and religious authority subject only to the rule of sacred law (*sharia*) based on the Koran and the Prophet's Tradition. The only valid bond among the members of this community was that of common faith ("all Muslims are brethren") which was to transcend and replace the bonds of family, tribe, origin and nationality. The Islamic state was universal (and implicitly imperial) in its concept, inasmuch as the faith it was to uphold and expand was given to all mankind and not to a particular tribe. In such a state, idolaters could not be tolerated.

However, the Jews and Christians, as Peoples of the Book (*ahl al-kitab*), could live peacefully and practice their religion as protected subjects (*dhimmi*) who were excused from military duty but, in turn, were obliged to pay poll and land taxes (*jizya* and *kharaj*). Because the bond of Islamic faith was emphasized while national origin was deemed irrelevant, the Turkish nationality of Ottoman sultan-caliphs did not constitute an impediment to their enjoyment of legitimacy. In fact, the Arabs—though initially subjected to Turkish rule by conquest—did not regard themselves as a conquered race, but as equal members of the Islamic community of believers. Furthermore, high offices of the state were as open to them as to any other Muslim subject of the Empire, whether Kurd, Circassian, Laz or Berber.<sup>4</sup>

Thus constituted, the Islamic state differed in many respects from the Western state as it evolved from the Middle Ages to modernity. The West differentiated between the secular authority (the German Emperors of the Holy Roman Empire and their successors) and the religious authority of the Church. In Islam, the authority was indivisible. The West developed the concepts of territorial sovereignty

and territorial law. In Islam, the territorial aspects of state rule were secondary while law followed a man's religion, thus giving rise to a plurality of legal orders.

In the West, society was officially stratified according to occupational criteria into land-owning nobility, town-dwelling burghers, land-tilling peasants and churchmen. In the East, the only formal division was that of religion; all Muslims were equal, with only factual differences in wealth. Because in the West the task of the state was primarily temporal, laws were enacted under the state's auspices—either by absolute kings or parliaments—and, being man-made, could be changed to suit the circumstances.

In the East, the process of legislation had theoretically ended with the death of the Prophet Mohammed (the "Seal of the Prophets"); the only valid law was the sacred law, eternal, immutable, antedating the state as the emanation of Allah's will. This law embraced the totality of rules: religious (ethical and ritual) as well as temporal (civil and criminal) without differentiation as to their validity. It encouraged dogmatism, discouraged independent interpretation, stressed authority and precedent and, in its wider impact upon the thought-processes of the Muslims, led them away from rational speculation and a search for causality. In the same way, the essentially religious character of the state was not conducive to the spread of secular education.

In the West, evolving political theory concerned itself with the rights of kings, the concept of state sovereignty, freedom, authority and representation. By contrast, Islamic po-

litical thought focused on the Prophet's legacy in terms of an ideal caliphate. Foremost Muslim jurists of the Middle Ages debated and elaborated the principles of caliphial legitimacy, searching to reconcile classical theory with actual practice.<sup>5</sup> They laid particular stress on the principle of obedience to the ruler, even if he were a usurper, in their belief that even an unjust rule was preferable to anarchy. Concentration on the person of the ruler had further ramifications: the Islamic state did not develop the concept and practice of impersonal civil service, secure in its rights. Its taxation system—during the Ottoman period—took the form of tax farming (*iltizam*),<sup>6</sup> which gave rise to gross abuses and all-pervading corruption.

Similarly, lacking a concept of citizenship, subjects of the sultan, regardless of their rank, lived in a state of perpetual personal insecurity. This, in turn, acted as a deterrent to economic development by discouraging investment in long-range industrial projects. The preferred types of economic activity were trade (with small capital input and an expectation of quick return) and agriculture. Much of the land, however, was either state-owned or administered by the pious foundations (*awqaf*) and thus was not cultivated with an eye to long-term improvement.<sup>7</sup>

### EARLY PENETRATION OF WESTERN IDEAS

In the course of the four centuries of Ottoman rule, the Islamic Middle East settled into a state of intellectual, social and economic stagnation. Beginning with the eighteenth century, the West embarked upon a policy of eastward expansion. In contrast to the Ottoman expansion, Europe's penetration of the Eastern Mediterranean was not only military, but also cultural and economic. It occurred in several stages, each characterized by a different emphasis. Together, they made a profound impact upon the Islamic East, setting in motion evolutionary and revolutionary processes which not only altered the political map of the area beyond recognition but also brought about major internal transformations.

The process of importing Western goods

<sup>5</sup> For a summary of theories of Al-Mawardi, Al-Ghazali, Ibn Jamaa, and Ibn Taymiya, see E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 21–61. Consult also H. A. R. Gibb, "Al-Mawardi's Theory of the Khilafah," *Islamic Culture*, July, 1937, pp. 291–302, and G. E. von Grunebaum, *Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1961), pp. 127–140.

<sup>6</sup> Gibb and Bowen, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 1–69.

<sup>7</sup> For a fuller discussion of the Ottoman agrarian system, consult Alfred Bonnè, *State and Economics in the Middle East*, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1948), pp. 115ff.

and ideas (including technology, organizational devices, political concepts, cultural orientation and social customs) could be described as both planned and spontaneous, imposed and voluntary, depending on the time and the circumstances. In some cases, the Islamic East was a mere consumer of Western goods and facilities; in others, Western ideas and techniques were transplanted into the more or less receptive soil, thus generating further local repercussions.

The first major transplantation, representing a deliberate act of will of the Islamic rulers, was that of military organization and technology. Sultans Selim III and Mahmud II (at the end of the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries) grasped the fact that Europe's supremacy and expansion were primarily due to its military superiority. So did Egypt's autonomous ruler, Mohammed Ali. Out of this conviction, in both cases, grew bold programs of military reform. But to make them truly effective, they had to be accompanied by parallel measures to reorganize the finances and administration of the state. While the Ottoman *tanzimat* reforms focused more on codification of laws and the security and liberty of the subjects of the Empire,<sup>8</sup> Mohammed Ali's policies placed greater emphasis on economic and fiscal measures, largely geared to the increase of the financial and military power of the government.<sup>9</sup> Both reform movements were launched by the rulers from above; neither contemplated a radical change in the prevailing concept of the polity; both had as their aim the strengthening of the existing structures.

But no human action can long remain isolated. Improvements in military technology and the streamlining of administration

brought about the need to train officers and officials in the new skills. They had to be educated either in Europe or in the schools—military and civilian—established, often with European instructors, in Turkey, Syria and Egypt. This, in turn, led to a second phase of Western penetration—the educational offensive—during which French clerics and American missionaries (to mention two important Western groups) began founding schools and missions. Missionaries soon discovered that proselytizing work among Muslims was illegal and futile and that, in terms of religious activities, they were restricted to operations among such minorities as the Greeks and Armenians who already professed Christianity.<sup>10</sup>

Consequently, their attention turned to medical services and education. In both, they were eminently successful. Medical work earned them the gratitude of both the people and the governments, while through their educational activities they breached the wall separating the two civilizations, creating a major opening for the influx of Western ideas. The American University of Beirut, Robert College in Istanbul, the French Jesuit University in Beirut, and the American University at Cairo bore testimony to the success of this endeavor. Initially, their student clienteles were recruited mostly among the Christian minorities of the Ottoman Empire; in due time the Muslim element began to increase in size, eventually to assume a majority position.

## CONSTITUTIONALISM AND NATIONALISM

Exposure to Western ways and ideas among the students caused greater awareness of the mainsprings of Western superiority compared with the decadence of the lands of Islam. Behind a Western cannon, frigate or steam engine, there was an engineer, a scientist or a naval architect, all products of a society which encouraged rationalism, science and independent inquiry. Furthermore, that society provided a basic socio-political framework within which such activities and virtues could flourish. Before long, groups of Ottoman officers and Western-educated civilians

<sup>8</sup> Sir Harry Luke, *The Old Turkey and the New* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1955), pp. 44–65; also Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 73ff.

<sup>9</sup> A. E. Crouchley, *The Economic Development of Egypt* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1938), pp. 40–44, 101–103.

<sup>10</sup> For an account of American missionary activities, see David H. Finnie, *Pioneers East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 112–136.

began formulating demands for a more fundamental reform in the Empire.

Activities of these Young Ottomans<sup>11</sup> led to the granting by the Sultan of the first (*Midhat Pasha*) constitution in 1876 and the creation of the first Ottoman parliament. This success, however, was shortlived. Within less than a year, the newly ascended Sultan Abdul Hamid II suspended the constitution, ushering in a 30-year era of despotism and repression. Reformers had to work underground in secret societies or go into exile. In the 1890's, they re-emerged under the name of Young Turks, whose vehicle was the Committee of Union and Progress.<sup>12</sup> A coup they staged in 1908 brought the restoration of constitutional life and, somewhat later, the deposition of Abdul Hamid II and his replacement by a new sultan. In a parallel move, Persian reformers secured a constitution from Muzaffar ed-Din Shah in 1906.<sup>13</sup>

Introduction of secular constitutions and formal parliamentary systems in both Islamic empires represented the first major conceptual break with Islamic theory and practice. The successful reformers—now in power as ministers and deputies—spoke of the rule of law, of liberty and equality. Implementation of their principles was not perfect in societies where forces of traditionalism were strong enough to put up resistance to change.

In addition, two other factors prevented the full consummation of constitutional reforms: one was the outbreak of World War I, which drew in the Ottoman Empire as a belligerent and Persia as a reluctant bystander, whose neutrality was rudely violated by the Russian, Turkish, German and British forces and agents. The other—specifically

in the case of the Ottoman Empire—was the birth of Arab nationalism, which upset the political balance of the multinational state. Nationalism could be regarded as a reverse side of constitutionalism. The central motive force of constitutionalism was the concept of liberty. But liberty has its domestic and its international dimensions. The domestic dimension focuses on the individual and his rights in a given society. This dimension was best exemplified by the French and American constitutions, to be followed by similar fundamental laws of many countries in the West.

The international dimension refers to the collective right of an identifiable ethnic group—the nation—to independence. This latter dimension invariably claimed precedence over the domestic dimension whenever a nation (such as the American colonies, Poland, Hungary, Finland or Greece) was subjected to rule by another nation. This collective struggle for independence provided the essence of nationalist movements in central-eastern Europe which, in contrast to the nation-state system in the western part of the continent, was divided into four multinational empires: the Russian, German, Austrian and Ottoman.

Within the Ottoman Empire two broad nationalist trends could be discerned: (a) the national struggle for the liberation of the Balkan Christian nations in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries (Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, Rumania); (b) “the Arab Awakening” which, initiated as a movement of cultural revival at the end of the nineteenth century, blossomed into a full-fledged political movement during the decade preceding World War I.<sup>14</sup>

Arab nationalism was a composite product of a number of influences. European ideas of liberty and nation provided the basic background. Added to this was the search by Arab Christians, particularly those of Lebanon and Syria, for a secure and dignified place in their society. As a religious minority in an Islamic state, they were relegated to a position of second-class citizens. However, if the concept of state were to shift from a religious to a secular emphasis, if nationality

<sup>11</sup> For a thorough discussion of this movement, consult Serif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).

<sup>12</sup> Ernest E. Ramsaur, Jr., *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

<sup>13</sup> For an authoritative account, see Edward G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966).

<sup>14</sup> For a “classical” treatment of this subject, see George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1965).



rather than religion were to provide the basic bond of loyalty, they would obtain—as Arabs—the status of equality with their fellow Muslims. Consequently, Syrian Arab Christians, especially those who emigrated to autonomous and less restrictive Egypt (under the Mohammed Ali dynasty and the British occupation after 1882), were the pioneers and the most ardent advocates of the idea of Arab nationalism.

This Arab search for national identity was further stimulated by the emergence of Turkish nationalism under the aegis of the Young Turks. The Young Turks' initial design was to promote the concept of "Ottomanism," i.e., impersonal loyalty of all citizens, regardless of religion and nationality, to the Ottoman State on the basis of full equality as guaranteed by the constitution. But Ottomanism proved to be an artificial concept which evoked lukewarm response from communities separated by centuries of mutual suspicion; it was soon eased out by the more vigorous but less universal idea of "Turkism" with its Pan-Turanian ramification.

Thus, on the eve of and during World War I, the Ottoman Empire was a scene of two mutually exclusive nationalisms, the Turkish and the Arab.<sup>15</sup> The Arab movement gained momentum when, as a result of an agreement with Britain (the McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1915), the Sharif of Mecca called for a revolt against the Turks. Although the Sharif (later the King) Hussein was not a secularist, his act was a direct challenge to the traditional Islamic concept of state, in which obedience to the Caliph was in no way to depend on the nationality of his subjects. Here again the West, this time

represented by Britain's imperial interests, acted as a major catalyst in a revolutionary break with the Islamic past.

### PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY UNDER WESTERN GUIDANCE

The Ottoman imperial structure did not survive the strains and blows of World War I. When it crumbled, it was replaced by two mutually incompatible forces: Western imperialism and Middle Eastern nationalism. In Anatolia, a new Turkish Republic emerged as a fairly homogeneous (except for a Kurdish minority) national state dedicated to secularization and to modernization of its entire social fabric.<sup>16</sup> In the Arab lands, a dual process took place: first, the lands were divided into eight states broadly corresponding to historically sanctioned divisions (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen); second, six of them were placed under the Western control (as a protectorate in Egypt, as mandates in the Fertile Crescent) of either Britain or France.

For the first time in the modern history of the Middle East (except for the British occupation of Egypt) the West was now physically present in the area en masse through its soldiers, governors, officials and experts. Both France and Britain chose a dual system of government: partly direct, by reserving certain fields and powers to their own officialdom, and partly indirect, by encouraging the erection of native state structures in the controlled territories.<sup>17</sup> Inevitably both sectors followed Western political and administrative patterns. Thus Syria and Lebanon became republics, while Iraq and Transjordan were constituted as monarchies. Palestine remained under direct British administration, because of the complicating factor of Zionist settlement. Egypt continued under a royalist regime which, in 1922, was unilaterally proclaimed independent by Great Britain, although the proclamation was hedged with such vital reservations as virtually to nullify it. The republics and monarchies were endowed with constitutions embodied in formal documents reflecting Belgian, French and other European patterns.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Zeine N. Zeine, *Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism* (Beirut: Khayat's, 1958).

<sup>16</sup> The Turkish process of modernization is comprehensively treated in Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963).

<sup>17</sup> Stephen H. Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 109–147.

<sup>18</sup> A comprehensive collection may be found in Helen Miller Davis, ed., *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of the States in the Near and Middle East* (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1st ed., 1947; 2nd ed., 1953).

Thus the new Middle East experienced two phenomena, both of Western origin: nationalism and parliamentary democracy. Nationalism grew in intensity and, in the Arab countries—frustrated in their hopes for independence after the Ottoman collapse—it was translated into a struggle for liberation directed against the British and French overlords. The parliamentary democracies were partly imposed from above by the controlling Western powers and partly corresponded to the modernizing outlook of their largely Western-educated elites.<sup>19</sup> To these elites, in the 1920's, the choice between a traditional Islamic state and a modern national state following the Western democratic patterns appeared fairly simple. Unhesitatingly they chose the latter, and the only unfinished business was to see their new states entirely free of foreign control. Between 1932 and 1945 this objective was realized: except for Palestine, each foreign-controlled Arab state obtained independence, formally sealed by admission to the League of Nations or the United Nations, depending on the date of emancipation.

In reviewing the Arab experiment with democracy it is useful to keep in mind the existence of these two phases: pre-liberation, with Western guidance; and post-liberation, when the Arabs stood on their own. Arab democracy, like any other, had its formal and informal aspects. Formally, the Arab states had constitutions following Western models. However, these documents retained certain special features reflecting either the legacy of the past or—in the post-liberation phase—concern with major current issues. Thus, a limited plurality of legal systems was formally maintained by recognizing the validity of religious law and courts in the matters of personal status (marriage, divorce, adoption) and of tribal law and courts for those groups which lived in a state of tribal organization (the Constitution of Iraq of 1925, Articles 69

and 88).<sup>20</sup> Another legacy of the past was discernible in the provisions which proclaimed that "the Islamic law shall be the main source of legislation" (the Syrian Constitution of 1950, Article 3).<sup>21</sup>

On the other hand, concern with contemporary preoccupations was visible in those provisions which stressed with particular assertiveness (unknown in Western constitutions) that the country in question is "a sovereign state, independent and free," whose territory cannot be either detached or divided. Similarly, there was formal recognition of the quest for unity, for example in Article 1 of the Syrian Constitution of 1950, which proclaimed that "the people of Syria is a part of the Arab nation."<sup>22</sup>

Within this formal framework, the political process was carried on through parties, groups, alignments and personal influence. In principle, multiparty systems prevailed. However, in the pre-liberation phase, one party with a broad nationalist appeal tended to overshadow the others, thus producing what may be conveniently called a dominant party pattern. This was clearly the case in Egypt, with the Wafd party outdistancing its rivals, and in Syria, with the National Bloc. These dominant parties were not able to maintain their preeminence in the post-liberation phase inasmuch as the nature of challenge, i.e., the shift from the struggle for independence to domestic concerns, had changed. Rival parties grew in numbers and strength, and a more genuinely multiparty pattern emerged.

Furthermore, a new breed of political parties made its appearance. Alongside the older "conventional" parties operating within the constitutional framework new "ideological" parties arose which challenged the legit-

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George Lenczowski lived in the Middle East from 1938 to 1945 and has made several trips to the area since then. Among other works, he is the author of *The Middle East in World Affairs* (3d ed.; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).

<sup>19</sup> For a comprehensive treatment, see Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

<sup>20</sup> Davis, *op. cit.*, 1st ed., pp. 107ff.

<sup>21</sup> Davis, *op. cit.*, 2nd ed., p. 404.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

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*"What is the outlook for Islam in North Africa?" asks this specialist. "A clear-cut answer is impossible." Yet "Islam has proven itself a resilient spiritual force in the Arab world."*

## Politics and Islam in North Africa

BY WILLIAM H. LEWIS

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SOCIAL SCIENTISTS CONSTANTLY bombard us with data confirming the notion that North Africa is in the midst of a profound social and political revolution. The area is increasingly caught up, they point out, in a process of change which is producing new urban agglomerations, new men, and new social formations. And the statistical material tends to confirm this—more than 25 per cent of North Africa's 32 million people now reside in large urban centers; in excess of 50 per cent are participants in non-barter economies; a still larger proportion of the school-age population is enrolled in non-traditional educational institutions; and personal relationships are clearly being developed without consideration for the constraints of custom.

A corollary contention is that modernization will inevitably lead to the elimination of Islamic institutions and the secularization of life within corporate kinship and related groups. According to this version of the modernization process, religion and religious values will become detached from societal and political interests since they are not germane to modern life.

At initial glance, this unravelling process appears to be operating with full force in North Africa. As a result of European intrusions over the past ten decades, the Islamic community of believers has lost any semblance of its former historical élan. The body of legal precedent contained in the *Sharia*, the sacred law of Islam, has undergone pain-

ful reevaluation. In several nations, modern European codes have been superimposed; the *Sharia* has been reduced to personal status jurisprudence; and church and state have clearly been separated. Finally, Islam as a traditional religion embracing all aspects of human endeavor seems to have lost its wider vision of community (*Umma*) and, under the corrosive influences of materialism and secularism, seems to have shrunk to a body of moral principles guiding individual values and behavior.

And yet, there is evidence that indicates that Islam remains something more than a vestigial religious and cultural force in the Maghreb. The emotional reaction of North Africans to the defeat of their Arab brethren in the Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967, surprised many Western observers, who felt that the Maghreb had proceeded so far down the path of change that no sense of affinity with the Arab East remained. During a ten-day period, beginning on June 5, spontaneous protest marches erupted in Casablanca, Rabat, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli and other modern centers. In several instances, United States and British chancellories had to be guarded by local security forces and, in one case, United States consular personnel were evacuated from their posts as a result of mob violence. For her part, Algeria summarily broke diplomatic relations with the United States, a rupture that remains in effect at this writing.

The outrage and shame at the Israeli vic-



tory felt by the average North African also led several Maghrebien governments to offer token forces to the U.A.R. Only those from Algeria actually reached Egyptian territory; an Algerian contingent is currently stationed along the west bank of the Suez Canal. However, Libya continues to provide substantial financial support to the U.A.R. and Jordan, to assist them through their difficult postwar reconstruction period. In addition, the activities of Arab commando groups, such as *Al-Fatah*, are warmly applauded in North Africa, and most governments have interposed no objections to fund-raising campaigns by commando (*fedayeen*) organizations.

### THE MEANING OF ISLAM

These reactions suggest that, despite far-reaching changes in the fabric and texture of life in North Africa, large numbers of Muslims continue to retain a sense of identity with one another, at least vis-à-vis non-Muslims. Western social scientists may be adopting too simplistic an approach. Islam has always been less an organized religion than a transcendental faith concerned with the establishment of an intimate relation between the individual and his Maker, as well as with his fellow men. As Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith has observed:<sup>1</sup>

Islam is obedience or commitment, the willingness to take on oneself the responsibility of living . . . according to God's proclaimed purpose; and submission, the recognition not in theory but in overpowering act, of one's littleness and worthlessness before the awe and majesty of God. It is a verbal noun: the name of an action, not of an institution; of a personal decision, not a social system.

Nowhere has this been more clearly demonstrated than in the continued fidelity of North Africans to Islam after the post-World War II collapse and virtual disappearance of the once powerful religious brotherhoods and *Sufi* (mystical) leadership class. The religious brotherhoods so popular in nineteenth century North Africa outlasted their usefulness during the period of French rule; many

of their leaders became mere puppets for French authority and, because of their dependence upon French subventions, opposed emerging nationalist movements such as the *Istiqlal* and the *Neo-Destour*. In time, the brotherhoods, together with such spiritual functionaries as the *marabouts*, were discredited.

Their eclipse should have signalled the decline of Islam as a vital social and spiritual force. But this did not occur. The role vacated by the traditional leaders was assumed by a new generation of North Africans. In most instances, these men played major parts in leading their countries to independence. Not surprisingly, they were not theologians or religious mystics; they were a conglomerate group, consisting of political conservatives as well as socialist progressives, royalists and republicans, revisionists and reformers. Propelled by circumstances to assume the responsibilities of national leadership, they also had to serve as the principal defenders of those religious values which continued to be cherished by broad segments of the population.

In brief, such diverse figures as King Hassan II of Morocco and King Mohammed Idris Al-Senussi of Libya, as well as Presidents Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and Houari Boumédiène of Algeria, share a common interest—to ensure that the political and spiritual interests of their people are consonant. Because they are the custodians of the national religious heritage, each functions in the informal capacity of an *Imam*, or leader of the religious community, as well as serving as temporal head of the state.

Despite differences in background, education, temperament and political outlook, each North African leader has sought to establish certain norms for his constituents. Each has also made an effort to promote a national ethos predicated upon a combination of the old and the new. How each leader has responded is instructive.

### TUNISIA

President Bourguiba has probably proceeded with the greatest vigor and enthusiasm

<sup>1</sup> Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion* (New York: New American Library, 1964), p. 103.

in the renovation of Islamic institutions. Using a combination of personal exhortation, government legislation, and campaigns by national organizations, Bourguiba has many achievements to his credit. Through a 1956 Code of Personal Status, polygamy was abolished, civil marriages were sanctioned, and a legal minimum age was set for marriage. Women were permitted to vote for the first time during municipal elections held in 1957 and, in the same year, the Tunisian National Women's Union was organized. In 1958, a far-reaching educational reform program incorporated traditional Islamic schools into the national system. Over the past 12 years, all religious tribunals have been suppressed; the traditional system of *Habus* (properties held in religious trust) has been abolished, and inheritance arrangements long sanctioned by religious convention have been modified.

Probably the most dramatic progress registered thus far in Tunisia has been in the educational field where, since the 1958 reform, the government has sought both to Arabize instruction and to keep the French language within a bilingual system. The following school enrollment figures are illustrative: (1) there were more than 900,000 students in the primary and middle levels during 1968, as compared to 320,000 in 1958; (2) nearly 100,000 students matriculated at the *lycée*, or secondary level, in 1968, as compared to less than 20,000 ten years ago; and (3) there was a five-fold increase in students at the university level.

There is also the equally significant fact that, while male students still far outnumber the female, the latter's enrollment rate is increasing at a relatively faster pace—a clear indication of the support accorded female emancipation by the Bourguiba government.

On the whole, there have been few voices raised against these reforms. The bulk of Tunisians tend to view them as both progressive and helpful to national development. As a result, they are willing to accept the President's guidance on most matters affect-

ing the advancement of Muslim-Arab culture. There are certain pillars of their faith, however, which they will not permit even Bourguiba to modify without serious reservation. Such was the case in 1960-1961, when the President launched a campaign to discourage fasting during the holy month of Ramadan on the grounds that this particular custom affected individual output and, thus, the productivity of the nation as a whole. Bourguiba's appeals ultimately led to widespread criticism forcing the President to terminate his campaign.

President Bourguiba is also aware of the dangers posed by uncontrolled change. As pointed out by Charles F. Gallagher, evolution which is too rapid becomes a revolution in values and could "menace Tunisian society with a loss of equilibrium."<sup>2</sup>

... Seemingly, President Bourguiba sensed the dimensions of the gap threatening to divide . . . [the] avant-garde segments of modern youth from the bulk of the townspeople and the villagers, and even in many cases from their own elders—the generations of only 10 or 15 years ago. In a speech made in early August, 1966, which can be read as a model of long-range political sagacity . . . Bourguiba put the brakes on the excesses of the evolution by denouncing loose morals, closing down some dancing establishments, and even banning some examples of "wantonness," such as miniskirts. . . .

Bourguiba has since also had to confront student disorders on university and *lycée* campuses.

In the fall of 1968, several scores of students were placed on trial for seditious activities, and harsh sentences were meted out. According to a white paper issued in August, the principal fomentors of student "subversion" were a combination of clandestine Communist party agitators (outlawed in 1963), a Trotskyite movement consisting of professors and students, and several Ba'athist organizations reportedly directed from Damascus and Beirut. Whatever the sources of inspiration, widespread student unrest does pose a serious problem for Bourguiba—and, in time, he may have to grapple with the question of how far and how fast to proceed with his reform program.

<sup>2</sup> Charles F. Gallagher, "Tunisia Modernizes," *Africa Report* (Washington, D.C.), March, 1968, p. 11.

## ALGERIA

Algeria's leaders, by comparison, are confronted with dilemmas of a distinctively different order and magnitude. At independence, in mid-1962, Algeria had few conventions or institutions to guide her through her difficult post-war period of rehabilitation. A sturdy democratic tradition had not been implanted; politics had largely been the preserve of the European. Experience in the art of governing was limited and no meaningful effort had been made during the seven-year period of the liberation struggle to organize cadres of administrators, technicians and bureaucrats. Finally, no politically integrative mechanism emerged from the early nationalist experience. Unlike Tunisia's Destourian-Socialist party, the aura of legitimacy that surrounded the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) (the engine of revolution from 1954-1962) was dissipated in the ensuing scramble for power.

Algeria could ill afford the internecine rivalry that followed close on the heels of independence. Her economy was a shambles, the exodus of nearly one million European settlers virtually paralyzing the modern sector they had previously dominated. Essential skills and the revenues needed to reconstruct the country were lost. Within the Muslim community, the ravages of war had been extensive. More than 250,000 Algerians had been killed and a half million wounded; 300,000 Muslims had fled the country to wait out the war as refugees in neighboring Morocco and Tunisia; two million had been uprooted and placed by French authorities in what were euphemistically designated relocation centers. In addition, material damage to peasant farmlands had been far-reaching.

Today, more than five years after independence, Algeria remains a nation in the process of reconstruction. Under the leadership of President Boumédiène, a measure of order and stability has been established. However, Algeria's leaders (essentially a military-technocratic coalition) have failed to create the national institutions needed effectively to link them with the majority of Algerians. Politics remains conspiratorial, inducing cau-

tion and suspicion where openness and public confidence are imperative.

Boumédiène himself lacks Bourguiba's talent for public oratory and is rarely able to move his audiences. He is convinced, however, of the need to move his country in the direction of self-improvement and development. The transformation he seeks involves the restructuring of Algerian society in order to bring all Algerians into the modern sector. Unlike Bourguiba, however, Boumédiène apparently does not wish to refashion the country's religious institutions or to reform her moral and spiritual values. He has opted for a local variety of Islamic socialism, the terms of which include preserving the traditional values while at the same time engaging "the masses" in an effort to create a new political order. This regenerative process has not produced any major successes, however, and Algeria remains a country in the process of formation. The future of Islam in this process also remains indeterminate.

## THE MONARCHIES

By contrast, Islam is an important underpinning of power for the Moroccan and Libyan monarchies. In the case of Libyan King Idris, his dual position as head of the *Sanusiya* confraternity (a brotherhood founded in 1842) and *Imam* of the national religious community strengthens his role as the leader of a brittle nation which came into existence under United Nations auspices in December, 1951. Given the absence of established national organizations and political parties, the King has tended to rely upon traditional tribal alliances and arrangements to bolster his power position. Because the *Sanusiya* brotherhood has its roots in Cyrenaica, the homeland of both the tribes and the King, this area constitutes a political core area for monarchical influence and control.

Moroccan King Hassan's power base is much more extensive than that of Idris. The King is regarded by the overwhelming majority of Moroccans as the embodiment of the nation and the symbol of its legitimacy. The mystic bond that exists between the ruler and his people was formed during the colonial per-

iod when Hassan's father, the greatly venerated Sidi Mohamed ben Youssef, became the spiritual leader of the Moroccan drive for independence.

The *Istiqlal*, then in the forefront of the nationalist movement, was an urban-based organization without a significant following in rural areas—where 75 per cent of the population is to be found. Regional, tribal and ethnic divisions in colonial Morocco were pronounced. Only one individual proved capable of overruling these divisions, Mohammed V, who made clear his support for nationalist objectives shortly after the conclusion of World War II.

The ruler's preferences earned him official French ire and on August 20, 1953, Mohammed V was removed from the throne and placed in enforced residence abroad. This proved a major miscalculation. Almost immediately, the "martyred" ruler became the embodiment of national unity, the symbol of accumulated grievances, and the justification for launching a violent campaign against the French. For the first time in its modern history, the nation was united in one strong emotional reaction.

The King, rather than the *Istiqlal*, became the principal beneficiary. Once restored to the throne in 1955, Mohammed V was endowed with a sanctity bordering on beatification. He was the olympian father figure, anointed with religious grace, above parties and special interests; in short, Mohammed V was the epitome of the charismatic leader.

The contrast with Tunisia was striking. Morocco had evolved no political system capable of sustaining the country in the post-independence period. The nation had produced a saint, instead, pledged to protect the Islamic religion and traditional institutions. At the same time, the King was expected to serve as arbiter among competing political formations, each with its own special interests and ideological orientations. Since no existential network of loyalties and interests existed, the monarchy remained above the tumult symbolizing the unity of the nation and mediating among its diverse segments.

With the death of Mohammed V in 1961,

Hassan II ascended the throne to carry forward his father's policies. A national constitution was approved on December 7, 1963, and elections to a lower house were held the following year. However, this body, laden with representatives from a multiplicity of parties, was immobilized by disagreements and passed virtually no legislation. Following riots in Casablanca over student rights and the plight of workers, the King declared a "state of exception" in mid-1965, dissolved the Parliament and assumed full personal powers.

The story of Hassan's rule since 1965 is far from inspirational. Cabinets have been constantly reshuffled, economic projects have been announced and forgotten, and the situation of large numbers of Moroccans—particularly those in urban centers—has deteriorated. Nevertheless, Hassan's power is virtually unchallenged. His strength lies in the loyalty of most Moroccans to the monarchy, predicated in part upon the respect still held for Hassan's father and the enduring religious-political influence that is an integral part of the monarchical institution.

To the extent that Islamic values are identified with the monarchy, and to the extent that the throne is felt to be a protector of the country's religious heritage, Hassan will continue to have an essential power base. However, these factors contribute to the essentially conservative nature of the monarchy. The loyalty accorded Hassan by the overwhelming majority of his rural countrymen is likely to reinforce this conservatism, especially in matters of political power.

What is the outlook for Islam in North Africa? A clear-cut answer is impossible. The forces currently at work in North Africa are elusive and depend upon too many vari-

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*"Like many other countries the world over, Turkey has shown many of the symptoms of the generation gap during the past several years. . . . One of the roads toward meeting the problems of youth and of the nation lies in education, and Turkey appears to be making considerable progress in that direction."*

## Turkey: A Contemporary Survey

BY HARRY N. HOWARD

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DESPITE HER MANIFOLD problems, Turkey has moved forward during the past several years in relatively orderly paths of political, social and economic development. In part, this is to be explained by the fact that the republic has had some 45 years of experience, however troubled at times—as in 1925, 1930, 1960, and even during 1963–1965. Under the banner of Republicanism, Populism, Secularism, Statism and Reform, Turkey went through a basic revolution under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

Atatürk was a modernizing genius, one of the few leaders in a developing society to assemble an elite group of administrators who were able to carry on under his driving direction and after his death on November 10, 1938.<sup>1</sup> Behind Atatürk and his revolutionary

reforms were some 200 years of gradual change in the Ottoman Empire, often halting and inadequate, and often blunted in implementation. Under Atatürk, the movement toward secularism and nationalism was carried forward boldly by a one-party authoritarian regime.

While the changes did not take such deep root in the countryside, and there were many difficulties with the more conservative elements anxious to hold on to the older traditions, Atatürk saw clearly that renunciation of the polyglot empire (which in any event had passed into history after World War I), abolition of the Caliphate, and freeing the state from Muslim religious institutions were fundamental to basic change and reform. Foreign and imperial adventures were eschewed. The nation-state was to be built on essentially secular foundations in the Turkish Anatolian homeland, together with Eastern Thrace and the region of Istanbul. The first quarter-century of the republic was primarily a period of political and cultural consolidation. The ruling elites strove to create the unity and stability necessary if the idea of belonging to the Turkish nation were to take deep root. Nationalism, with its doctrines and symbols, became the fundamental ideology during this formative period.<sup>2</sup>

A one-party system prevailed in the early period despite attempts to bring in loyal opposition parties. The Republican People's

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<sup>1</sup> See especially Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965); John Patrick Douglas Balfour, Lord Kinross, *Atatürk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey* (New York: Morrow, 1965).

<sup>2</sup> Among the basic reforms were the abolition of the Sultanate (1922) and the Caliphate (1924), the suppression of the religious orders (1925), secularization of the law (1926), elimination of reference to Islam as the religion of the state (1928), introduction of the Latin alphabet (1928), introduction of woman suffrage (1934), and introduction of family names (1935). See especially Donald E. Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Revolution* (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939); Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford, 1961).



party was finally defeated in the elections of May, 1950, when the Democratic party (established in 1946) captured the Grand National Assembly and the presidency. Nationalism had become a kind of conservative ideology, exploiting the legacy of Atatürk in the interest of the political, social and economic *status quo*. During 1955–1959, the social structure had become further diversified, and Turkey needed a government which would recognize the various social groups and accept their claims to participate in both political and economic power. Thereafter, the basic task was to harmonize the political regime with the developing social structure. The coup of May 27, 1960, which overthrew the government of Adnan Menderes, brought problems of social and economic development and adjustment very much to the fore.

By this time the state and the republic were well-grounded in the experience and tradition of the Turkish people. Prompted by the spirit of Turkish nationalism, the new constitution, promulgated on July 9, 1961, dedicated the nation to the Atatürk principle of "peace at home, peace in the world," national independence and the reforms of Atatürk. The Turkish Republic was "a nationalistic, democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law, based on human rights."<sup>3</sup> Islam was no longer a major ideological force capable of complicating Turkish social, economic and political institutions, even if it still played a role in day-to-day political life. It remained as a source of traditional and cultural, rather than political, influence, as one of the basic elements that had shaped Ottoman and Turkish life and character.

<sup>3</sup> For the text see *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring, 1962), 215–238.

<sup>4</sup> See Kemal H. Karpat, ed., *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1968), Part II; Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill, 1964).

<sup>5</sup> Representation of other parties in the Senate was as follows: Reliance party, 11; Turkish Labor party, 1; New Turkey party, 1; National party, 1; Independents, 4; Presidential Appointees, 15; and Life Senators, 14. The Turkish Labor party had 15 seats in the National Assembly; the New Turkey party, 19; the National party, 31; and Independents, 11.

While the Muslim religion appeared to be a primary source of inspiration and identity, especially in the rural areas, the processes of secularism had gone so far that religion in Turkey could be approached more or less in the Western manner. The sharper edges of religious controversy and conflict evident in the earlier period of the republic had been smoothed out. While the Turkish people might look toward spiritual revival, this would hardly alter their basic orientation, as it might have in the 1950's when religion was exploited for political purposes.<sup>4</sup> The countryside was undergoing change, albeit slowly, and the young had little or no nostalgia for "old times."

### POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Something of this background appears to be reflected in contemporary Turkish politics. Following the elections of October, 1965, the Justice party, successor to the defunct Democratic party which fell from power in the coup of May 27, 1960, emerged as the dominant element on the Turkish political scene. Süleyman Demirel became Prime Minister, and the Justice party won 256 out of 450 seats in the National Assembly, as compared with 134 for the Republican People's party. In the elections of June 2, 1968, it won 101 seats in the Senate, as compared with 34 for the Republican People's party and scattered representation for other parties.<sup>5</sup> Demirel felt that the multi-party political system had been confirmed and that Turkish voters were opposed to the "inflation" of political parties and were, indeed, moving toward political maturity and stability. While the responsibilities of the Justice party, in his view, had greatly increased, and Turkey was entering a new working order, extremists of the right or left found no fertile ground in Turkey. On the other hand, the Republican People's party, under the leadership of former President İsmet İnönü and Bülent Ecevit, the Secretary-General, which had suffered a split in 1966, moved left of center in the interest of attracting a wider spectrum of voter support.

It is possible, of course, that failure to solve

domestic problems or the complicated issues involved in the Cyprus question might once more bring the Turkish army to intervene in the political system. However, this did not happen in 1965, and it now appears doubtful that the army will intervene unless the democratic political process itself is placed in jeopardy. In an address of August 30, 1968, President Cevdet Sunay noted that the aim of the state was "to secure a living standard worthy of human dignity of every citizen," and that the effort "to secure social justice and security" should consolidate and accelerate development efforts. But he opposed the curtailment or abrogation of constitutional rights, and he decried extremist elements. It was not "legitimate" to push the constitution "to the extreme right or the extreme left with *faits accomplis*."

If Turkey maintains her political stability and moves toward a rational and balanced development of her economic resources, the country may look forward to a bright future. Primarily an agricultural country, she is also rich in mineral resources, with coal, copper, sulphur, lead, meerschaum and oil. The state budget for 1967-1968 totaled £T 18,814,000,000 (£T 9 to \$1.00)\*, while that for 1968-1969 reached a record total of £T 21,602,000,000, with revenues of £T 21,112,000,000. Defense requirements, however, absorbed some 40 per cent of the expenditures. Under the direction of the State Planning Commission, established in 1960,<sup>6</sup> Turkey has moved forward under a planned economic

system stressing state participation in the economy and private enterprise.

The first five-year plan (1962-1967), part of a 15-year program, substantially achieved its goal of a 7 per cent (6.6 per cent) annual increase in the Gross National Product (GNP), from £T 53,000,000,000 to £T 74,000,000,000.<sup>7</sup> The second five-year plan (1968-1972) also envisaged a 7 per cent increase, with investment to reach £T 111,500,000,000 by 1972. Foreign assistance needs, which totaled an annual \$350,000,000 during the first period, were estimated to fall from \$247,000,000 to \$229,000,000 by 1972, and independence from such assistance was to be achieved by the beginning of the third plan in 1972.

In the second plan, stress is placed on industrial development and the reduction of dependence on agriculture, with 22.4 per cent allocated to manufacturing, or £T 25,000,000,000, a sum double the amount realized in the first plan. Priority is assigned to chemicals, fertilizers, iron and steel, paper, petroleum, cement and vehicle tires, with second priority given to machinery and equipment. Irrigation and machinery are stressed in agricultural planning. Government investment is to concentrate on the infrastructure and education and public health, with private enterprise centering on manufacturing.

Prime Minister Demirel presented an optimistic picture of the Turkish economy in mid-1968. Oil production, which substantially met domestic demands, had reached some 2,728,000 barrels, and a new pipeline, from Batman to Dörtol (on the Gulf of Iskenderun) had a daily capacity of some 79,000 barrels. The Keban Dam, on the Euphrates, on which work had begun in 1966, was expected to have a generating capacity of some 1,240,000 kilowatt hours by 1972. The 670-foot-high dam was to hold back a lake 70 miles long at the confluence of the primary Euphrates branches, and power was to pass through a 400-mile grid system to industries of the northwest and to serve as a power source for eastern Turkey as well. However, it threatened archaeological treasures dating back to 4000 B. C., and the

\* All figures in this article are from Turkish government sources. The £T varies in value from £T 9 to £ 12 to the dollar.

<sup>6</sup> A five-year plan for industrial development, most of which was to be government-owned, was announced in January, 1934. The great depression, however, necessitated a policy of rigid economy, although the encouragement of agriculture, opening of mines and construction of railways and roads continued.

<sup>7</sup> In his 1968 budget message, United States President Lyndon Johnson observed that, by 1970, Turkey would need no further assistance from the U.S.A.I.D. program. He noted that "the future of Turkey" was "very bright, indeed." Since 1962 there had been a 6.6 economic growth; industrial output had increased by 9 per cent; and food production had increased "far more than the increase in population." Turkey was "now financing nearly 90 per cent of its investments out of its own resources."

government set aside some \$335,000 for a survey project, directed by the Middle East Technical University of Ankara, with a view to their preservation.

Turkey had considerable financial assistance in her industrial development, especially from the United States (\$2,300,000,000 in economic and \$2,500,000,000 in military assistance), the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union. In the latter instance, it is noteworthy that agreements were signed with the U.S.S.R. for seven projects, financed by a \$250,000,000 credit for construction of aluminum, sulphuric acid, oil refinery, steel and fiber board installations. A supervising Industrial Consultancy, consisting of 7 engineers and 5 administrators, was to be established in the Soviet Embassy, and some 1,000 technicians, under appropriate Turkish surveillance, were to work on the projects. But the Turkish government objected to the establishment of an agency similar to the U.S.A.I.D. Mission. Association with the European Common Market, through whose European Investment Bank some \$105,000,000 had been channeled, had proved worthwhile, and Turkey was scheduled to complete its entry by December, 1969.

Agricultural methods were considered out of date, and there was a feeling in government circles that production could be increased from two to four times without large investments, the key to efficient production being the development of agriculture in accordance with climatic conditions, with seed and cultivation adjusted to conditions. Cereal production was estimated at some 19,000,000 tons during 1968, the use of Mexican (Sonora 64) wheat being credited for a significant increase. During 1967, some 381,500 acres were distributed to farmers and some 277,500 acres were distributed in 1968. Government loans to farmers totaled \$29,000,000 in 1967 and increased to some \$77,000,000 in 1968.

On the fringes of the economy, it is noteworthy that some 200,000 Turkish citizens were working abroad in Europe, primarily in Germany, and that their remittances averaged

some \$100,000,000 per year. The impact of this situation, both on the economy and the polity, is bound to be very significant.

## EDUCATION

Like many other countries the world over, Turkey has shown many of the symptoms of the generation gap during the past several years and student demonstrations were among the elements of the *malaise* which erupted in the coup of May, 1960. On May 19, 1968, President Sunay, on the occasion of Youth Day, called for an end of dissension and appealed for consensus and compromise, noting that Atatürk had "handed the Republic and the reforms to the youth," and that "the people or groups with whose thoughts and beliefs we disagree are also members of this community." Extremist movements and conduct, he declared, did not fit the Atatürk legacy. Nor could problems be solved out of context. And he added that "the common sense of the community should eliminate the extremist trends." Prime Minister Demirel observed that nothing could be done without scale and balance, that exploitation of poverty (the average Turkish income is \$275 to \$300 per year) offered no way out, and that it was up to the people to remedy the situation, not constantly to repeat it.

One of the ways to meet the problems of youth and of the nation lies in improved education, and Turkey appears to be making considerable progress in that direction. Much has been done to meet the problem of illiteracy since the 1920's, and by 1968 literacy was estimated at 65 per cent, although only 30 per cent in the villages were literate. The number of elementary schools rose from 12,500 in 1950 to 32,000 in 1968, and the number of teachers rose from 27,000 to 93,300. There were reading rooms in every town and many villages, with libraries, radios, meeting halls and recreational facilities. The past 30 years have demonstrated the very special importance of vocational and teacher training, and by 1968 there were some 830 vocational or trade schools with 11,500 teachers and 195,000 students. There were

also 110 institutions of collegiate rank, with more than 100,000 students, and eight universities. In the field of education, Turkey seems well on the move into the future, whatever the problems which lie ahead.

## FOREIGN POLICY

Turkish foreign policy in 1968 continued to develop in the direction of independence, based on highly realistic considerations in a very strategic area of the world at the inter-continental crossroads. Although the trends had earlier roots, anti-American and pro-neutrality sentiments began to develop in Turkey in 1964. When the new United States Ambassador, Robert W. Komer, arrived in Turkey on November 29, 1968, students rioted in protest. While the American position on the very sensitive problem of Cyprus stood out as the most significant factor, other factors were the presence of a large number of American troops, the development of a new socialist movement and the Turkish Labor party, Turkish dissatisfaction with the U.S.A.I.D. program, alleged C.I.A. attempts to intervene in Turkey's domestic affairs, and Soviet receptiveness to Turkish moves toward a more "friendly" relationship. But there was an ingrained caution in Turkish policy toward the Soviet Union. The Turkish position at the Straits significantly influenced Russo-Turkish relations as far back as 1774. In 1967, no less than 6,192 Soviet merchant vessels, of 26,631,409 tons (out of a total of 17,398 ships, of 59,512,793 tons, or 44.8 per cent), passed through the Straits. In 1967, some 240 Soviet warships transited the Straits and by 1968 it was clear that the Soviet Union, with some 50 to 60 warships in the Mediterranean, had come into the inland sea to challenge the United States monopoly in that area, and to exercise a psychological influence in the Middle East, North Africa and Southern Europe.

These developments were of much concern to the Turkish government and, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, it reaffirmed its basic position both in NATO and in CENTO. President Sunay observed on August 30 that, in the

interest of maintaining her own independence and sovereignty, Turkey would have to fulfill her "mutual pledges and commitments," recent developments once more having proved "the necessity for and use of our alliances." In turn, it was noteworthy that the NATO Council, during November 15-16, 1968, observed that "the new uncertainties resulting from Soviet actions" extended to the Mediterranean basin, and warned that "clearly any Soviet intervention directly or indirectly affecting the situation in Europe or the Mediterranean would create an international crisis with grave consequences."

The Turkish position was reiterated during the visits of West German Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger and French President Charles de Gaulle in the fall of 1968. At the same time, Turkey consolidated her relationships with her neighbors both north and south, in the Balkan area and among the Arab states, and there were numerous official visits to strengthen ties. Both Greece and Turkey supported local discussions on the island of Cyprus which, it was hoped, would make a positive contribution towards a formal settlement there, and there was a steady relaxation of tension during 1968, even if a formal settlement was not in sight. In the Middle East, Turkey was much concerned with the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and generally sided with her Arab neighbors. The Turkish government attached great importance to the establishment of cooperation based on mutual understanding with the Arab countries, with which Turkey has strong moral, historical and cultural ties.

It was doubtful, as the year 1969 dawned, that Turkish foreign policy would undergo any basic change. On the domestic scene great problems remained, but there was considerable ground for encouragement that orderly processes of development would meet

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*"... in areas where Islam is well entrenched it has in the past served as a major socio-political force, giving to many areas a common culture and language, a unified code of law, and a sense of community, thus helping to bridge the gap between tribalism and regionalism, and preparing the way for a more fully integrated nation-state."*

## Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa

BY TAREQ Y. ISMAEL

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**T**HAT ISLAM in sub-Saharan Africa is a significant force cannot be doubted. There are currently some 50 million Muslims in Africa south of the Sahara, and an equal number in North Africa. Thus, about one out of every three Africans is a Muslim. Furthermore, the number of new converts to Islam in sub-Saharan Africa exceeds converts to Christianity by a large margin. The American evangelist, Billy Graham, put the ratio at 7 to 1 in favor of Islam; others set the ratio from 3 to 1 to 10 to 1.<sup>1</sup> The impossibility of obtaining reliable statistics precludes a more accurate judgment. Yet it is clear that Islam is advancing rapidly.

The cause of the success of Islam lies in a number of factors. The old animist religions of Africa, bound as they are to the soil and traditional agricultural life, are no longer adequate in the face of sweeping social changes pervading African life. With the people cut off from their traditional setting and drawn into new, particularly urban, economic activities, the basis of the old religions is gone, thus creating a religio-social vacuum. Islam provides one answer to the problem be-

cause "of the comforting religious values it embraces."<sup>2</sup>

Islam's advantage here is due to two factors: it is largely, particularly in West Africa, an indigenous religion (as a consequence of the long period of interaction with the Muslim influences emanating from North Africa and Arabia). Preached by Africans for Africans, in any case it does not have the stigma of colonialism and racism which attaches to Christianity, and the simplicity and flexibility of the Islamic structure lend themselves readily to adaptation or "Africanization." That is to say, Islam is added to the old animistic religions rather than substituted for them. Syncretizing with native elements has produced a distinctly African Islam. Thus, the new convert merely sees the supreme deity of his animistic faith interpreted as none other than Allah; worshipped ancestors become the angels, saints, and jinn of Islam; nature, fertility and possession spirits are jinn and devil; and, finally, witchcraft, oracles, magic and divination, well-established themes in Muslim culture, are readily adaptable to their African counterparts.

Thus long-established beliefs and rituals are merely refined, incorporated and reinforced by the new religion. Many indigenous social customs, too, such as polygamy, which is widespread in Africa, are tolerated by Islam. By contrast, the African Christian convert must largely purge himself of his native ani-

<sup>1</sup> Kenneth Hughes, "Christianity and Islam in West Africa: II. The Approaching Confrontation," *Christian Century*, February 26, 1964, p. 298.

<sup>2</sup> William H. Lewis, "Islam and Nationalism in Africa," in *The Arab Middle East and Muslim Africa*, ed. Tibor Kerekes (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 70.



mistic beliefs, rituals and ceremonies, and accept an alien and complex rigid dogma with its own set of practices that are not altogether relevant to African tradition.

### ISLAM'S CONTRIBUTION TO AFRICAN SOCIETY

In a more positive sense, Islam has made a significant contribution to African society. First, it is an ethical and moral monotheistic religion with a universal message facilitating a truly spiritual awakening. Second, it has been not only a religion but a way of life, governing the individual's personal and interpersonal relations from birth to death. Muslim law (*Sharia*), the foundation of Islamic society, has, like the religion itself, undergone much adaptation and modification in Africa. Yet it does give African Muslim society a cohesiveness, culture and ideological orientation that transcends ethnic or tribal affiliation and cuts across national and international borders. Thus, "once converted, the African has acquired membership in a community as well as a religious system."<sup>3</sup>

Regarding the contribution of Islam to the individual, an early work (1928) by W. Wilson Cash points out that "as a Moslem, he [the pagan] immediately awakens to a sense of his personal value and importance. . . . This is important because it has developed an individual responsibility, which, in turn, has made possible a greater coordination in rule and law than obtains among pagans."<sup>4</sup> W. W. Cash also points out that Islam has somewhat elevated the African in the social and intellectual spheres. Within the social realm, "his individuality is developed, a consciousness of a destiny to high

things is born in him, and his desire to advance grows."<sup>5</sup> Similarly, on the intellectual side, "he begins to learn to read . . . memorizes the prayers . . . [and may become] fascinated by the study of Islam, the Koran and the Traditions."<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, W. W. Cash points out, in ethics "there is no doubt that the Moslem African is frequently superior to the pagan."<sup>7</sup> And finally, through Islam, a written language was introduced into Africa, which, through its synthesis with native dialects, has produced a purely African literature in idioms such as the Swahili, Hausa and Fulani. Of course, the introduction of Christianity and Western civilization during the colonial period, occurring well after the incursion of Islam into the area, has produced other, sometimes additive, often competing, influences.

### THE SUFI ORDERS

There is another factor in African Islam that lends dynamics to its proselytization and cohesiveness to its structure—the existence of Sufi (mystic) orders or brotherhoods that pervade and dominate the area. Thomas Hodgkin points out that to become a Muslim and to join a brotherhood "are often in practice synonymous."<sup>8</sup> Many of these fraternities such as the Ahmidiya, Tijanniyya and the Ismailiya manifest a missionary zeal that has given considerable impetus to the spread of Islam in Africa. More fundamentally, most of these orders help to preserve the orthodox doctrine of African Islam, thereby somewhat maintaining the continuity of the faith. They also provide an organized expression for religious life with a centralized hierarchical structure leading down from the master (*marabout*) to the ordinary disciple. Further, they strengthen the concept of a pervasive religious society and provide "a label and ritual link between diverse peoples"<sup>9</sup> that cuts across ethnic and national boundaries.

However, in another manner, the existence of the orders works as a divisive force. Although primarily orthodox their various organizations and rituals differ considerably, and many of them are locally oriented and engender particularism.

<sup>3</sup> Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, "The Islamic Factor in African Politics," *Orbis*, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (Summer 1964), p. 441.

<sup>4</sup> W. Wilson Cash, *The Expansion of Islam: An Arab Religion in the Non-Arab World* (London: Edinburgh House Press, 1928), p. 179.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 182.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Thomas Hodgkin, "Muslims South of the Sahara," *Current History*, June, 1957, p. 348.

<sup>9</sup> J. Spencer Trimingham, *A History of Islam in West Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 158.

Today, the orders do have some significance in internal African politics. One need only consider the case of the Sudan, where inter-denominational rivalry between the Khatmia brotherhood, which attached itself to the Ashiqqa party, and the Ansar, followers of the Mahdi, who formed the Umma party, played a dominant role in Sudanese politics. As in this instance, in other strongly Muslim countries rivalry between the orders has been a significant factor in internal politics. Moreover, with the hierarchical structure which maintains centralized control over the brotherhood, the head of the order often exercises significant political or economic power. The Mouride order in Senegal provides an illustration of this. The Mourides, primarily farmers, by strength in numbers control a significant part of Senegal's agricultural land. Their head (called the *Khalife*) can influence some 400,000 votes. As André Tollevast observed, "No politician can take a chance on defying such electoral power, and it is unquestionable that in 1965 Mouridism represents in Senegal a sociological reality that must be taken into account."<sup>10</sup>

### ISLAM AND NATIONALISM

Although no distinctly Muslim opposition to colonialism developed (except for Mahdism in the Sudan), the Islamic communities did provide an effective institutional framework that gave some areas a cultural and social unity<sup>11</sup> which, when harnessed to the nationalist movement, could provide a ready-made cohesive organization with centralized control as a basis for nationalist endeavor. Furthermore, according to I. M. Lewis,

particularly in West Africa, as the heirs of a commercial and partly urban tradition concerned with long-distance trade and the pilgrimage, with at the same time a fund of Muslim knowledge and some command of a written lan-

guage and administrative experience in both the pre-colonial and colonial regimes, . . . local Muslims clearly possessed a unique heritage which could be applied to the development of modern nationalism.<sup>12</sup>

Of course, these same resources could be used against nationalist aspirations, depending on whether or not the nationalist aims coincided with Muslim interests.

In the cases of Mali, Senegal, Guinea, Somaliland and the Sudan Republic, Muslim interests and nationalist aspirations were in general accord and thus facilitated the nationalist movement. On the other hand, where Muslim interests had enjoyed special protection under colonial status, as in the case of some East African communities such as Zanzibar, the Muslims generally resisted the nationalist appeal which would threaten their favored position. Again, according to I. M. Lewis,

the contrast here can perhaps be seen when the success of popular "radical" nationalism in Mali is compared with its failure . . . in Northern Nigeria, following the French destruction of traditional Muslim power in Mali and its preservation by the British in northern Nigeria.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, the state of the nationalist movements has been affected by the bent of the Muslim communities. For example, in Senegal the Muridiyya and Tijanniyya fraternities have favored strong ties with France. The degree to which their position has been instrumental in shaping Senegal's policies is difficult to determine, but certainly must be taken into account. On the other hand, the reformist Hammalist movement, an offshoot of the Tijanniyya order, provided a powerful vehicle for social protest against colonialism and Muslim complaisance during the period between the two world wars and, in Lewis' words, "helped to prepare the ground for the emergence of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* after the Bamako conference of 1946."<sup>14</sup>

### ISLAM IN POLITICS TODAY

In its political effects, Islam may be viewed in the context of single nations, or of a region. Africa's Islamic population falls into a number of geographic areas, determined by


<sup>10</sup> André Tollevast, "The Moslem Mourides of Senegal," *France-Eurafrique*, July-August, 1965, pp. 39-40.

<sup>11</sup> Abu-Lughod, *op. cit.*, p. 439.

<sup>12</sup> I. M. Lewis, "Introduction," in *Islam in Tropical Africa*, ed. I. M. Lewis (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 83-84.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86.



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the manner in which Islam was introduced and its present characteristics. The Mediterranean littoral—Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco—is not within the main area of interest of this article; here the Muslim population is an overwhelming majority and has been since the seventh century; the Arab Muslim character of the region places it more appropriately in the Middle East than in Africa with respect to Islam. Central Africa, on the other hand, and the areas to the south have such a small Muslim population at present—although Islam is rapidly expanding into these areas—that it has had no major effects; with the exception of small areas in the Congo and northern Mozambique, Islamic influence in South and Central Africa is negligible.

Our concern is with the major portion of Africa in which the Islamization of Africa and the Africanization of Islam operate in the context of modernization. The regions that contain significant numbers of Muslims provide the best clue to the role of Islam and may be designated as follows: the Western Sudan; the Eastern Sudan; the Horn of Africa; East Africa; the Southern Sudan; and the West African tropical areas.

The Western Sudan includes Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Senegal and Gambia. It is in the broad savannah belt that extends from the Atlantic coast to the Ethiopian highlands. Islam penetrated the area from about 1050 A.D., largely in the form of mass conversions of their subjects by the conquering rulers desiring religious sanction of their conquests

under the name of *jihad* (holy war). Although this Islamic influence was initiated in Arabized North Africa, the conversions were usually carried out by Africans, either Negro or Berber, whether peacefully or militarily. This process continued through the nineteenth century, when colonization by European powers stopped the wars, but encouraged peaceful conversion by itinerant *marabouts*. Islam in this area is identified strongly with the Sufi orders, especially the Tijanniyya. Despite the large proportion of Muslims in the area, only Mauritania is a self-proclaimed Islamic state, and the political power of Islam seems limited by the secularization of politics. Leopold Senghor, for example, the Roman Catholic President of Senegal, a nation 80 per cent Muslim, has experienced little difficulty because of religious differences.

The Eastern Sudan, to which Islam was carried up the Nile River from the seventh to the tenth centuries, is largely included in the Sudanese Republic (formerly the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan), the largest state in Africa. Here, Sufi orders have played an important role in politics, as mentioned earlier, but their role may be viewed in terms of factors other than Islam. The strength of the orders makes Islam an important force, but not always a unifying one.

The Horn of Africa, as it is usually called, includes the Christian Ethiopian Empire and the Islamic Somali Republic. Since Muslims waging *jihad* against Ethiopia were defeated in 1542, the mountain kingdom has been left to itself. The Somali tribes are largely Muslim, but ties of family, language and culture may be stronger unifying forces. The Somali occupy large areas outside of the Somali Republic, and conflict has arisen over these *irredenta* in Kenya and Ethiopia. The fact that the Somali are Muslim and their neighbors are not has been used by the Somali to obtain aid from the Arab Muslim states, but the situation may be more political than religious.

The three East African countries of Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya were reached early by Arab traders and settlers; however, aside from the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba,

this contact did not assume any magnitude anywhere. The Arab Islamic influence remained confined to the coastal areas (Mombasa, Dar es-Salaam, Zanzibar, Mogadishu) and did not penetrate inland. Thus, the Muslims of Uganda and Kenya number three and four per cent of the population respectively, and many of these are Indian and Pakistani Shi'ites brought in by the British in the early part of this century. In Tanzania, while Zanzibar is 99 per cent Islamic, the mainland has only 19 per cent Muslims, centered in Dar es-Salaam. Sectarian divisions and small numbers render Islam in East Africa a divisive factor in internal politics.

The Southern Sudan lies across the southern parts of the West Sudanic states and the northern portions of Guinea, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon and other coastal states, and includes Upper Volta and Niger. The area has a population usually divided about equally between Muslims and others, and this leads to serious divisions within the states if the religious differences become politically relevant. In these states the Muslim population is concentrated in the north and is usually a conservative force.

In the Guinea coast states, the leadership is usually from the southern Christian groups, except in the case of Guinea. In this area, except for the occasional, sometimes serious, problem caused by a militant type of Islam, religion is of little relevance to political life at the national level except insofar as it is a divisive factor.

Thus, Islam *per se* does not appear to be a particularly dominant factor, at least at the national level, in African political life. However, the relationship of Islam to politics cannot be discerned outside of the context of the African political, social and economic scene. That is to say, in no case does Islam play such a well-defined role that it can be

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*"In order to survive in India as a community with its own culture and personality, Muslims must not only achieve a modus vivendi with the Hindus but must also modernize themselves. The exhortation that the Muslims in India as well as in Pakistan must participate in the world culture is constantly reiterated by their intellectual and political leaders."*

# The Muslims of India and Pakistan

BY HAFEEZ MALIK

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ACCORDING TO THE 1950 census, the Muslim population of India totaled 35.4 million; while increasing at a national growth rate of 21.49 per cent annually, Muslims are now estimated to be 55 million in the total Indian population of 500 million. India thus has the third largest Muslim population of any state in the world, the first being Pakistan (with 100 million) and the second, Indonesia.

Before 1947, the integration of Muslims within India was thwarted by the development of a separatist Muslim nationalism

which fulfilled itself in the creation of Pakistan. Consequently, Muslim integration in the Indian national community since 1947 is very largely intertwined with the unhappy incidents of violence which attended the partition. In addition, a majority of the Indian Muslims supported the Muslim League in the 1940's, and its demand for Pakistan. This created the unfortunate impression among Hindus that Muslims were not loyal to India. This feeling has ameliorated somewhat within India since the 1965 war with Pakistan, because Muslim soldiers and officers in the Indian army fought valiantly against Pakistan, and some of them were decorated for their bravery. Despite the Muslims' protestations of loyalty, however, Indian political culture has remained generally hostile to their aspirations.

This does not mean that Indian political culture does not aim at integrating<sup>1</sup> the Muslims within Indian society. The core of the problem lies in the differing interpretations and policies of integration maintained by different regions and political parties in India. In a real sense, the major Indian problem is to achieve the integration of Hindu society which is splintered linguistically, regionally, racially and, to a large extent, culturally.<sup>2</sup> While these differences among Hindus were simply overlooked in the days of national struggle for independence, they are now openly admitted and publicly debated.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "The term 'integration' covers a wide range of human relationships and attitudes—the integration of diverse and discrete cultural loyalties and the development of a sense of nationality . . . it is this which holds a society and a political system together." Cf. Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," in *Political Modernization*, ed. Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1967), p. 152. Integration thus takes place at various levels i.e., national integration, territorial integration, and value integration and elite-mass integration. In this study some of these concepts pertaining to the Muslims' situation are explored.

<sup>2</sup> For example, in North India a niece is like a daughter to an uncle, whereas in South India it is perfectly desirable for an uncle to marry his niece.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. S. R. Das (former Chief Justice of India), "Common Heritage and Culture," *The Hindu* (Madras), November 22, 1968, p. 8. Discussing the problems of national integration, Das maintains ". . . we have to approach the question of national integration against the background of the very real diversity of race, religion and language. We have to devise ways and means for integrating these divergent concourses of people into a single nation."



Broadly speaking, North India is Indo-Aryan, and South India is Dravidian. While the bond of unity is Hinduism, four Southern states nevertheless continue to nurture their historic grievance and resentment of northern Aryan "imperialism" and "arrogance."

Historically, South India has had little contact with the Muslims, even when it was a part of the Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526) and the Mughal Empire (1526-1857). The Muslim population in the Southern states varies from a low of 4 per cent in Madras to a high of 17.91 per cent in Kerala; and under Muslim rule the percentage must have been much less. Consequently, the memory of Muslim hegemony in the South is academic; the political culture is tolerant of the Muslims and they are a vital force in politics. The Muslim League, which was eliminated in the North after the partition, continues to represent the Muslims' interest in the four Southern states, and is currently a member of the Communist-led coalition which rules Kerala.

In sharp contrast to the South, Northern political culture is intensely antagonistic towards the Muslims. The reasons are largely historical. From the first decade of the eighth century, the Hindu encounter with political Islam took place in the North; and, finally, the Northwestern and Eastern parts of India left India to form the Islamic state of Pakistan. Selig S. Harrison appropriately remarks that

the fulfillment of Indian nationalism requires an assertion of Hindu hegemony over the Muslims of the sub-continent in one form or another, . . . and it was deeply frustrating that at the very moment when Hindus were to rule over Muslims

for the first time in their history, so many of the Muslims should escape their appointed fate.<sup>4</sup>

Unfortunately, much of the wrath of the Hindus, who had been dominated for centuries by Muslims, fell upon the Northern Muslim minority. It would, however, be grossly unfair if this statement were not further qualified. After the partition, in a sense, the ruling All-India National Congress party was freed of its commitment to establish a secular Indian constitution. Nevertheless, it is to the credit of the Congress party that it honored the high ideals of its leaders, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, by making India a secular state.

The recognition of the secular ideal was in itself important for minorities in general and for the Muslims in particular. The secular constitution provided the general framework within which the Muslims could organize their religious and cultural activities, and carry on their struggle for the status of first-class citizens in the Indian Republic.

Within the framework of the secular constitution, what is the official definition of integration? The Indian National Integration Council, which was established by Nehru in 1961, and was headed by Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the present Prime Minister of India, offered a broad definition: ". . . the process involving the development of a feeling of unity, solidarity and cohesion in the hearts of the people, a sense of common citizenship, and a feeling of loyalty to the nation."<sup>5</sup> Leftist political parties have by and large adopted a liberal policy of integration regarding the Muslims and other minorities and have indicated their willingness to share political processes with them. On the contrary, the extreme rightist parties have offered revivalistic definitions of Indian integration, calling for the complete religious and cultural assimilation of minorities. *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (R.S.S.; founded in 1925) and its political arm, *Bharatiya Jana Sangh*, which is the largest opposition party in the Indian Parliament and is a coalition partner in the several state governments, advocate "Hinduizing India and militarizing Hinduism." Looking to the *vedas*<sup>6</sup> and the early Aryan

<sup>4</sup> Selig S. Harrison, "Troubled India and Her Neighbors," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1965, p. 319.

<sup>5</sup> B. K. R. Kabad, "National Integration," *Times of India*, February 15, 1968.

<sup>6</sup> Hindu sacred literature includes four different types, namely the *Samhita* or collection of verses; (they are *Rig-Veda*, *Sama-Veda*, *Yajur-Veda* and *Atharva-Veda*), *Brahmanas*, *Aranyakas*, and the *Upanishads*. According to Hindu belief, the *Vedas* "were revealed as commandments and prohibitions to show the true path of happiness. The *Upanishads* only revealed the ultimate truth and reality, a knowledge of which at once emancipates a man." The *Upanishads* are also known by another name—*Vedanta*. See Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), vol. I, pp. 13, 28-30.

conquest of India in 1500 B.C. for inspiration, they organize anti-cow-killing demonstrations and regard all religious minorities as subversive to Indian national culture.

Defining *Jana Sangh's* concept of national integration, its president, Balraj Madhok, has stated: "... whatever the religions of India may be, India has one culture, and that is Indian culture. That culture has its roots in the *vedas* ... so there is nothing to fear for Muslims, Christians and others."<sup>7</sup> Madhav Rao Golwalker, the president of R.S.S., is, however, more explicit than Madhok in his definition of national integration:

There are some people who declare that they have achieved unity of Hindus, Muslims, Christians and all others on the political and economic plane. But why limit the oneness only there? We say that we stand not only for political and economic unity but also for cultural and religious unity.<sup>8</sup>

The latter definitions of integration are at variance with that of the Muslims. According to Muslim leaders, Indian secularism, like Western secularism, is supposed to guarantee a neutral government in matters of religion and culture, permitting cultural pluralism. The Muslims protest that Indian leaders and even scholars—while paying lip service to the ideal of secularism—often equate secularism with conformity to Hindu culture and political patterns. *Jamā'at-i Islami* of India, dedicated to the preservation

<sup>7</sup> Balraj Madhok, *What Bharatiya Jana Sangh Stands For* (Delhi: Navchetan Press Ltd., 1966), pp. 4, 6.

<sup>8</sup> Golwalker, *Sangh Darshan*, p. 11.

<sup>9</sup> *National Integration and Jamaat-E-Islami Hind* (Delhi: Markazi Maktaba, 1962), pp. 14–15; also, Maulana Abul Lais, *Presidential Address of The All-India Conference, Jamaat-E-Islami Hind* (Delhi: Markazi Maktaba, 1960), pp. 29–31; *Policy and Program of The Jamaat-E-Islami Hind* (Delhi: Jamal Press, n.d.), pp. 9–10.

<sup>10</sup> Maulana Qari Muhammad Tayyab, *Qāwmi: Awr Bayn al-Qawāmi Itihād*, Ed. Akhlāq Husain Quasmi (Delhi: Lal Kūan, n.d.). Cf. also Tayyab's *Islamic Principles of National Integration* (Delhi: Lal Kūan, n.d.), Maulana Tayyab is the Shaikh al-Jamīa' of Dārul 'Ulūm Deoband.

<sup>11</sup> In a memorandum to Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, Muslims of Ranchi indicated: "More than 700 Muslims were killed, thousands injured, properties destroyed, looted, burnt and women abducted." Cf. *Ranchi Riots: Factual Analysis Of The Tragic Happenings in August 1967* (Delhi: Sampradayikta Virodhi Committee, 1968), p. 9.

of Islamic culture and religion, passed a resolution in July, 1961, which was submitted to the National Integration Council:

... in a vast country like India which is the cradle of several communities and cultures it will not only be against the constitution of the country but will also seriously damage the cause of integration itself if an attempt is made to bring an integration which threatens the existence of the individual cultures and identities of these communities.<sup>9</sup>

Another "nationalist Muslim" organization has expounded a nine-point concept of integration, including Islam's emphasis on "the unity of the entire human world," respect for all religious leaders including Hindu divinities, i.e., Ramā and Krishnā, and the repudiation of violence in the propagation of religion because the Koranic dictum—*Lā Ikrahā fi al-Din*—prohibits compulsion in religion. Also included are the principles of political freedom, the love of fellowman, the abolition of economic inequality and prohibition of discrimination "on the basis of birth and caste." Lastly, there is an appeal for world unity; and an exhortation for the Muslims to "present their individual and collective life as the symbol of the holy life of the Prophet."<sup>10</sup>

These diametrically opposed interpretations of national integration generate contrary and exclusive expectations which produce fear on the part of the Muslims and overt hostility from right-wing Hindus. This hostility manifests itself in the frequently planned riots organized by the R.S.S. and *Jana Sangh*, in which Muslims lose their lives at a ratio of six to one, and lose their property also. During the last 20 years, more than a thousand riots have taken place in India. Joseph Lelyveld, the India-based correspondent of *The New York Times*, points out that

since 1964 about 1,500 Indians, some 1,250 of them Muslims, have been killed in communal riots ... in August, 1967, at least 170 Muslims—some say at least twice as many<sup>11</sup>—were killed in the industrial center of Ranchi in Bihar after Hindu demonstrators opposing any concessions to Muslims on the status of Urdu, the language spoken by them, there clashed with Muslims students.


Even more than a year after the riots in

Ranchi, about 1,000 Muslim employees of the Heavy Engineering Corporation are "still huddled together in a dormitory they have been using as a refugee camp." During 1968, bloody riots took place in the well-known cities of Meerut, Calcutta, Allahabad, Karimgang, Manglore, Hyderabad, Aurangabad and Nagpur. Muslim sources maintain that thousands of Muslim lives were lost, while Lelyveld indicates "the loss of more than 100 lives, the proportion of Muslim dead to Hindu dead has been at least 5 to 1 and sometimes 10 to 1."<sup>12</sup>

The displaced residents of the Heavy Engineering Corporation township in Ranchi refused to return to their homes unless the management allocated a whole block to them. K. D. Malaviya, chairman of the corporation, revealed that the management intended to disperse the Muslim population because it "would foster their integration"<sup>13</sup> with the Hindus. Muslims have charged that the pattern of anti-Muslim violence, and at times the dubious official deterrence, is aimed at the elimination of their distinctive cultural traits and at achieving their total assimilation. The insecure Muslim population withdraws into itself, thereby exposing itself further to the charge of "separatism" and the creation of "little Pakistans." As the R.S.S. and *Jana Sangh* penetrate into the South (normally hospitable to the Muslims), the atmosphere of hatred and suspicion is diffused and Muslim politics is turned from participation in normal political processes to the politics of self-defense and survival. An examination of current developments in Kerala will illustrate this point, and will show the pattern in which anti-Muslim violence is organized by the right.

### PATTERN OF AGITATION

In 1968, the Communist Chief Minister of Kerala, E. M. S. Namboodiripad, and his coalition government, including the Muslim



—*The Hindu* (Madras), November 22, 1968, p. 10.

League, announced their plan to create two new administrative districts in the state. One of the two proposed districts (called Mallapuram) is to include the four *talukas* of Ernad, Tirur, Perintalmanna and Ponnani, constituting a total area of 1,954 square miles with a Muslim population of 927,511; Hindus, 652,671, and Christians, 68,000. These *talukas* are to be detached from the neighboring districts of Kozhikode and Palghat. The second district of Malnad is to be carved out of the present Enakulam and Kottayam districts, and would retain a Hindu majority. It is, however, the first district, now derogatorily called "Moplasthan" (since the Muslims in the Malabar region of Kerala are called Moplas) that has raised a storm of protest all over India. Critics have called it a "communal deal" between the Marxist Communist party and the Muslim League; the spectre of the disintegration of India has also been raised.

The district of Mallapuram is to be formed in 1969. To prevent its creation, the *Jana Sangh* and the Kerala Pradesh Congress have entered into a partnership of agitation against the United Front government of Kerala. Consequently, an "Anti-District Bifurcation Committee" was formed to mobilize public opinion against the formation of Mallapuram. The committee contends that the proposed district is both administratively unnecessary and harmful to "communal harmony"; while it appears to be mobilizing every resource in order to turn the latter appraisal into a self-fulfilling prophecy. In

<sup>12</sup> Joseph Lelyveld, "India's 55 Million Muslims Living in Rejection and Isolation," *The New York Times* (October 28, 1968), p. 20.

<sup>13</sup> *The Hindustan Times* (November 22, 1968), p. 8.

September, 1968, *Kshetra Samrakshana Samiti* (the Temple Renovation Committee) was created by K. Kelappan, a respected member of the Congress party and Sarvodaya leader in Malabar. The Temple Renovation Committee announced that it would claim for public worship the Thali temple (Siva) in Angadipuram. The temple has been in disuse for several decades and, according to the Kerala government, is located on government-owned land. Moreover, adjoining the temple is a mosque, which the local Muslim community regularly uses for prayers. During the Navarati festival last September, the Temple Renovation Committee organized a three-day *bhajan* singing at the Thali temple, thus disturbing the Muslims, who silently pray at the mosque. The government suspended further prayers by the committee for a month in order to deliberate upon the committee's appeal for transfer of the temple and the land to the committee. The State government, probably to soothe taut nerves, took no action for several weeks, and Kelappan and his supporters from *Jana Sangh* and the R.S.S. resumed their *bhajan* singing on November 16, 1968.

In an effort to head off trouble, the State government forbade public assembly around the temple and simultaneously transferred the Thali temple to the Department of Archaeology, declaring it to be a state-protected monument. This, however, has added fuel to the fire since the Minister of the Archaeology Department happens to be C. H. Muhammad Koya, a leader of the Muslim League. On November 21, a Delegates' Session of the State Conference of the Communist party (Marxist), reviewed the activities of the Temple Renovation Committee and the Anti-District Bifurcation Committee and suggested that the demand for the transfer of the Thali temple was a smokescreen to thwart the formation of the Mallapuram District, where Muslims would have a majority. The Communist-led coalition government of Kerala

has doggedly pursued its plans to create a Mallapuram District, while the central government of India has entered the fray, indicating its disapproval. Chavan, the Home Minister, has advised the Post and Telegraph Department not to create a postal district in the proposed district of Mallapuram, contrary to the Kerala government's suggestion.<sup>14</sup> The final outcome remains to be seen.

### MODERNITY VS. OBSCURANTISM

In order to survive in India as a community with its own culture and personality, Muslims must not only achieve a *modus vivendi* with the Hindus but must also modernize themselves. The exhortation that the Muslims in India as well as in Pakistan must participate in the world culture is constantly reiterated by their intellectual and political leaders. "The world culture," as defined by Lucian W. Pye, is

based on advanced technology and the spirit of science, on a rational view of life, a secular approach to social relations, a feeling for justice in public affairs, and above all else, on the acceptance in the political realm of the belief that the prime unit of the polity should be the nation-state.<sup>15</sup>

Secularly-oriented Muslim intellectuals in India believe that the greatest impediment to the modernization of their community is fear. Fearing the loss of its identity, the Muslim community tends to cling to its traditional ways of life. Secularists point out, for example, that Muslim personal law needs to be reformed by legislative enactment. Although monogamous marriages are now standard practice among the Muslims, it is legally possible for a Muslim to have four wives simul-

(Continued on page 175)

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Hafeez Malik is the author of *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968) and the editor of *Iqbal: Poet-Philosopher of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). Between 1961 and 1968 he was a visiting lecturer at the Foreign Service Institute of the State Department in Washington, D.C.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *The Hindu* (Madras), November 20, 22, 1968; *The States Weekly*, November 16, 30, 1968; *The Hindustan Times*, November 18, 24, 1968.

<sup>15</sup> Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 8.



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*Predominantly Muslim Indonesia, the "paramount power of the Malay world," has become a focus of the struggle between Communist China and the U.S.S.R. "Essentially . . . the central dispute between Moscow and Peking is not over whether the Malay world should or should not . . . be 'buried' but the best way to go about the job."*

## Indonesia: "Another Communist Disaster"

BY ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN  
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IN RECENT MONTHS the Indonesian Communist party (P.K.I.) has sustained a serious setback on Java. The latest debacle—characterized by Moscow as "another Communist disaster"<sup>1</sup>—has a three-fold significance. It marks the first overt attempt by the P.K.I. to try to regroup its shattered forces in the field under a new leadership. It confirms—if any confirmation is necessary—that the P.K.I. is determined to make still another bid to seize power in the islands forcibly. And it demonstrates anew, as the history of the P.K.I. has repeatedly shown, that the Communists have no popular base in Indonesia, the paramount power of the Malay world, unless they are in a position to attire themselves in the garb of narrow, militant and excessively extremist nationalism.

To appreciate the P.K.I.'s current strategy and tactics, we must return briefly to 1965 when the party suffered an unprecedented

defeat, unparalleled by its debacles in 1926, 1948 and 1951.

Three years ago, in 1965, in collaboration with President Sukarno and a group of disaffected "progressive, revolutionary" officers in the Army and Air Force, the P.K.I. plotted the liquidation of the Indonesian Army's general staff. The success of the operation would have swung the balance of political power within Indonesia in favor of the Communists. At the time, the P.K.I. was the largest political party in Indonesia; indeed, it was the largest Communist movement in the world outside of Russia and China. At the time, too, the Indonesian Army was the only remaining, effectively organized barrier in the path of an eventual Communist assumption of power in the largest archipelago on earth. The P.K.I.'s involvement in the putsch, known in Indonesia as the *Gestapu* affair,<sup>2</sup> is incontrovertible, although the complete details are unlikely ever to be known, given the conspiratorial nature of the purge.

The established evidence is overwhelming. Consider, briefly, some of these points. In the days leading to September 30, 1965, the Sukarno regime, with the P.K.I. in the vanguard, whipped up a hysterical campaign against the "enemies of the people" and called for their liquidation.<sup>3</sup> On the night of September 30, a Fifth Force<sup>4</sup> composed of 2,000 Communist youths gathered with their weapons at Halim air base, the nerve center

<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, September 14, 1968.

<sup>2</sup> The code name for the plot was "September 30 Movement," i.e. *Gerakan September Tiga Puluh*, which the Indonesian penchant for acronyms reduced to *Gestapu*.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, *Harian Rakjat* (People's Daily), Jakarta, September 28, 1965. See also *Antara* (official press agency) of that date.

<sup>4</sup> The concept of a "Fifth Force" was introduced into Indonesia by the Chinese Communists in January, 1965. An armed People's Militia, it was supposed to supplement or offset the four traditional forces, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police.



of the September 30 Movement, the code name for the plot. The following morning they participated in the slaughter of the Indonesian general staff. The following day, on October 2, *Harian Rakjat* (*People's Daily*), the official organ of the P.K.I. and at the time the daily with the largest circulation in Indonesia, editorially endorsed the purge as "patriotic and revolutionary."<sup>5</sup> P.K.I. leader Dipa Nusantara Aidit and Sukarno arrived at Halim on the morning of October 1; when the plot failed, Aidit fled to Central Java aboard an Air Force plane and Sukarno withdrew by road to a West Java mountain town. Various regional party branches declared "full support" for the Movement.<sup>6</sup>

Interestingly, both Moscow and Peking have "recognized the role played by the [P.K.I.] in the putsch."<sup>7</sup> The Chinese implicitly admit Communist responsibility as a historical fact that can no longer be disputed, whereas the Russians do not question the P.K.I.'s role in the affair "but, rather, try to explain it."<sup>8</sup> However, as soon as the question of responsibility for the failure of the purge is raised, the Russians and Chinese disagree completely. Both Moscow and Peking exploit the P.K.I. debacle to accuse each other reciprocally of the failure. An American academic, in Jakarta on September 30–October 1, 1965, observed:

Though the degree of P.K.I. involvement may never be definitely ascertained, the fact of involvement is denied by few, even including all

members of the banned P.K.I. interviewed by this researcher.<sup>9</sup>

The plot misfired when an important intended victim of the slaughter of the general staff, Defense Minister General A. H. Nasution, eluded the murderers in the confusion.<sup>10</sup> With popular support, drawn especially from intellectuals and student groups, the Army, under the command of General Suharto, moved swiftly to abort the plot. In the bloody aftermath, tens of thousands of persons were slain in mass reprisals.<sup>11</sup> It was a massacre of unprecedented scale in Malay history.

### NEW MOVES BY THE P.K.I.

During late 1967, against this background, the P.K.I. set about to regroup its shattered forces on Java (the party was largely Javanese in ethnic character). It sought primarily to reorganize itself in a "free zone," or liberated area, in the neighborhood of Blitar, East Java, the birthplace of Sukarno and a terrain pitted with volcanoes and dotted with rice fields. The Indonesian Communists, who had moved into the Chinese camp after 1963 within the framework of the Sino-Soviet schism, apparently planned to apply the Lin Piao thesis,<sup>12</sup> the strategy of "wars of national liberation." The strategy holds that the encircling of the cities from the countryside and the armed seizure of political power indicate the "correct and only road to be followed by nations striving for liberation."<sup>13</sup>

The plan was put into operation early in 1968. However, either in its enthusiasm or for reasons of domestic consumption, Peking tipped the P.K.I.'s hand. In January, *People's Daily*, the official Chinese Communist party organ, declared: "A revolutionary high tide against the Suharto-Nasution fascist regime is bound to come . . . guided by the great thoughts of Mao Tse-tung."<sup>14</sup> Within a matter of weeks, Peking reported an "uprising of revolutionary people near Blitar" and claimed that the "flames of revolutionary armed struggle" were spreading. The objective of armed action, it said, was to destroy the "Suharto-Nasution fascist military regime."<sup>15</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Harian Rakjat*, October 2, 1965.

<sup>6</sup> *Berita Yudha*, October 7, 1965; issued October 1, 1965.

<sup>7</sup> Branko Lazitch, *Paris, Est et Ouest*, January 1–15, 1968.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> Paper delivered by Roger K. Paget at Chicago, March, 1967, at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies.

<sup>10</sup> Officially, Minister Coordinator of Defense and Security, and Armed Forces Chief of Staff.

<sup>11</sup> See Horace Sutton, "Indonesia's Night of Terror," *Saturday Review*, February 4, 1967.

<sup>12</sup> "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," by Lin Piao, September 2, 1965. Lin, now Mao Tse-tung's heir apparent, was then Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist party's Central Committee and Defense Minister, with the rank of Marshal.

<sup>13</sup> *People's Daily*, Peking, September 18, 1967.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, January 13, 1968.

<sup>15</sup> *New China News Agency* dispatch, February 9, 1968.

By April, nurturing this fantasy, Peking averred that "the Communists and other revolutionary people of Indonesia have risen in arms to fight the enemy" and that "armed struggle is raging on all key islands of Indonesia."<sup>16</sup>

Chinese enthusiasm for developments within Indonesia was apparently encouraged by events in East Java itself. In the spring of 1968, more than 300 members of the Indonesian armed forces in the region deserted their garrisons with their weapons. They did so in a manner which suggested that the desertions were "well organized and coordinated."<sup>17</sup> This coincided with reports of clashes in parts of East Java which claimed at least 20 lives.<sup>18</sup> Then a jeep-load of Army officers, in the area south of Blitar, was ambushed. Familiar P.K.I. terror tactics in the villages were reported—intimidation, kidnapping and murder.<sup>19</sup>

The ambush was the biggest military success the revamped P.K.I. had scored since the resumption of its 48-year struggle for power in the strategically situated island chain. Depending on the point of view, the ambush was either a complete mistake or was executed prematurely. As in the case of Ernesto Che Guevara's abortive guerrilla campaign in the Andes, the incident acted as a magnet and drew massive security sweeps. Again, as in the Bolivian example, the Indonesian Communist militants lacked a popular base.<sup>20</sup> The result was disaster.

Indonesian Army units combed the area. Students assisted in the operations and villagers reported on P.K.I. movements. The Army registered singular successes in a series of battles with the Communists. Not only was the "free zone" dismantled but, more important, the Army reshattered the newly-reconstructed Politburo of the P.K.I. Oloan

Hutapea, a Sumatran who had assumed the leadership of the party following the capture and execution of the Communist "Big Five"—Aidit, Njoto, Lukman, Sudisman and Sakirman—was captured alive and killed almost immediately. Also taken were Rewang, a Politburo member and chief of the P.K.I. intelligence; Tjugito, a member of the old Central Committee and an underground organizer of some distinction; Munir, the former secretary-general of SOBSI, the Communist Federation of Indonesian Trade Unions which was dissolved after the abortive *Gestapu* affair; and "General" Sukatno, the leader of the Communist People's Youth (*Pemuda Rakjat*) which had participated in the murder of the generals on October 1, 1965, at Halim air base. The "General's" organization was made up mostly of street brawlers and thugs and was somewhat reminiscent of the Black Shirt and Brown Shirt groups in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in the 1920's and the 1930's.

Another casualty of special political interest was Surachman, a former confidant and minister in Sukarno's cabinet and a leader of the extremist wing of the Indonesian Nationalist party (P.N.I.) who was widely suspected of being a sub-rosa P.K.I. member. The P.N.I. was the largest secular party in Indonesia after the P.K.I. and it is generally felt in Jakarta that Surachman would have emerged as chairman of the P.N.I. had the September 30 Movement gone according to plan. The P.K.I. and P.N.I. were the Communist and nationalist legs in Sukarno's three-legged "popular front," NASAKOM. The third leg was the orthodox Muslim party, Nahdatural Ulama, whose venal leadership of the period had been largely bought out by Sukarno, a past master at corrupt political practices.

Suharto, who was installed as President of Indonesia in March, 1968, as the P.K.I. mounted its spring "offensive," later disclosed that in addition to the leaders killed or captured in the Blitar area, the Army also took "hundreds of cadres." All told, the government bagged 850 prisoners, including some of the military deserters. Suharto

<sup>16</sup> *Chekiang Daily*, Hangchow, April 2, 1968.

<sup>17</sup> *Agence France Presse*, February 17, 1968.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, February 20, 1968.

<sup>19</sup> John Hughes, *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 13, 1968.

<sup>20</sup> For an account of Che Guevara, one-time aide to Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, see Ernesto Che Guevara, *Guevarism: Bolivian Diary*, translated by Carlos P. Hansen and Andrew Sinclair (London: Cape and Lorrimer, 1968).

publicly described the P.K.I. operation as an attempt at "revival" and said the Communists had drawn elaborate plans to establish an underground network from the village to the provincial level.<sup>21</sup>

The subsequent interrogation of the prisoners led to the disclosure of a Communist web still operating in the armed forces and maintaining contact not only with the reformed Politburo of Hutapea, but with the deposed Sukarno, who had presumably been living quietly at a West Java hill station. Sukarno was summoned to Jakarta, interrogated for five days, and returned under guard to Batutulis, a lavishly appointed stone retreat which the former dictator had built for himself in the 1950's. Since his interrogation, Sukarno has been kept under formal house arrest. In turn, the interrogations led to the subsequent arrest of more than 350 officers in the armed forces, including men of senior rank.

Tragically, the Blitar affair ignited another round of anti-P.K.I. hysteria in East Java amid unconfirmed reports of a new wave of murders.<sup>22</sup> It also generated new demands for Sukarno's trial, especially following the statement of the able Major General Sutopo Juwono that the government had incontrovertible evidence of Sukarno's role in the *Gestapu* affair and that it would be impossible to dissociate him from the purge of the Indonesian general staff.

## REACTION OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD

One consequence rising from this fresh Communist setback on Java was a deepening split between the Soviet Union and Communist China over grand strategy in the Malay world.

The Soviet Union was furious. *Pravda*, the official organ of the Soviet Communist party, castigated the P.K.I. leadership for leading the party into another debacle.<sup>23</sup> The Kremlin denounced the "irresponsible adventure" and accused China of being the inspiration behind the armed foray. Indeed, at the very outset of the Blitar venture, the Russians subtly encouraged the P.K.I. to abandon the road of armed struggle in seeking to rebuild the party, telling Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik that the Kremlin was prepared to resume the supply of spare parts to the Soviet-equipped armed forces. Moreover, the Soviet decision was publicized within Indonesia.<sup>24</sup> Here, then, we have another parallel between the P.K.I.'s Blitar effort and the efforts of Che Guevara. Both of them not only lacked Soviet cooperation and endorsement, but encountered Moscow's hostility (in the case of South America, the Bolivian Communist party, beholden to Moscow, opposed the adventure).

The supply of arms to the Indonesian armed forces has been a feature of Soviet policy in Indonesia throughout the 1960's, despite the P.K.I.'s shift after 1963 into the Peking camp. The Soviet Union has apparently gambled that even a potentially P.K.I.-governed Indonesia would become, in the end, an ally of the Kremlin. The Russians banked on Sino-Malay racial hostility; on the P.K.I.'s historic Soviet-orientation; and on the armed forces' dependence at the time on Soviet military assistance. Accordingly, the Soviets plied Indonesia with \$800-million worth of overt aid, three-fourths of which was spent on military hardware. Much of the aid went to the Indonesian Air Force, whose upper echelons were eroded by Communist sympathizers, and the Indonesian Navy. Strengthening these services presumably neutralized or weakened the American and British Commonwealth forces in the region while simultaneously strengthening Indonesia against the Chinese Communists, who lacked both sea and air power.<sup>25</sup> The destruction of the Indonesian Communist party has not impaired this Soviet strategy.

The Russians have undertaken a wide-

<sup>21</sup> State Address of President Suharto to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Rojong (House of Representatives), August 16, 1968.

<sup>22</sup> *The Economist* (London), November 30, 1968. However, the article is not from a staff correspondent of the weekly, and is so marked.

<sup>23</sup> *Pravda*, September 14, 1968.

<sup>24</sup> See *Antara*, May 23, 1968.

<sup>25</sup> For fuller discussion see *Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents*, edited by A. M. Halpern (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 274-288.

ranging series of moves since the fall of Sukarno and the P.K.I. to befriend the new Suharto government, despite the subsequent wholesale liquidation of Communists. Significantly, for example, the Soviets do not refer to the Suharto government as a "fascist military regime," a phrase which the quasi-military regimes of the "left" glibly apply to their "rightwing" counterparts. The Soviet Union has also rescheduled Indonesia's debt and it made no move to block Indonesia's return to the United Nations in 1966. This suggests that Moscow was not unhappy with the fall of the P.K.I., a party which flouted the Kremlin's concept of a monolithic international Communist movement under Soviet direction. In Dostoevsky's words, the Kremlin "seemed so pleased in spite of its sorrow."

Of course, the Soviets have not been entirely at ease with the thought of maintaining friendly relations with post-*Gestapu* Indonesia. "Soviet policy," explained *Pravda*,<sup>26</sup>

is to support the Indonesian course towards national independence in the face of imperialist powers which are trying to exploit the political situation in Indonesia for their own neocolonialist aims.

In substance, Moscow is seeking to check Indonesia's complete slide into the so-called "Western" camp. Accordingly, Soviet post-*Gestapu* policy comes down to this: better half a loaf than none. It is for this reason that Moscow has been incensed by Peking's advice to the rump P.K.I. to wage a "war of national liberation" and has been equally angered by Indonesian Communist acceptance of this strategy.

The Soviet Union's post-*Gestapu* policy worked effectively in Indonesia until late 1968. The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, rekindled Indonesian memories of past Kremlin interventions in Indonesian affairs, notably the abortive, Moscow-directed Madiun affair in 1948. The latter misadventure came at a time when

the Indonesian Republic was reduced to Dutch-encircled enclaves and the Republic was fighting for its national existence.

Indonesia's leadership roundly condemned the Soviet occupation of Prague.<sup>27</sup> But the dust no sooner settled on this affair—actually the Prague situation remains as tense as ever at this writing—than there was new ground for disharmony between Moscow and Jakarta. Suharto rejected the clemency pleas of three Indonesian Communist leaders condemned to death by a special military tribunal for complicity in the September 30 Movement, including two Politburo members, Sudisman and Njono. Njono was arrested shortly after October 1, 1965, but Sudisman remained at large for a year trying to reorganize the party's infrastructure.

The Soviet Union pleaded with Suharto to spare their lives (doubtlessly in part to offset Peking's charge that Moscow had abandoned Indonesia's Communists). Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny sent a personal note to Suharto.<sup>28</sup> The Soviet Communist party lodged a protest against Jakarta on behalf of "millions of Communists" and warned Indonesia that she would have to bear the "disastrous consequences" if the men were executed.<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless, they were shot by a firing squad on October 29.

In reviewing the Blitar affair and the Moscow-Peking polemic over its outcome, it is especially noteworthy to focus attention on the heart of the Kremlin's case against Peking and the P.K.I., a critique which also may be applied to the Che Guevara fiasco. The Soviet Union declared:

Disregarding the Leninist position that an armed revolutionary struggle can be successful only when it has been carefully prepared and is based on broad support of the masses . . . [Hutapea and Peking] called on the Communists to go into

(Continued on page 174)

<sup>26</sup> *Pravda*, September 14, 1968.

<sup>27</sup> For example, see *Antara*, August 26, 1968, and thereafter. Indonesia hesitated briefly before condemning Moscow.

<sup>28</sup> *Antara*, October 25, 1968.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

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*"Generally the Russian Revolution was for Soviet Muslims an opportunity to free themselves from Czarist oppression; most of them have never been absorbed completely by communism. They submit to the central government only because they are convinced that their physical survival necessitates submission."*

## Islam in the Soviet Union

BY JOHN B. WOLF

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IN THEORY, the Soviet Union is a voluntary association of 15 autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics; in actuality, it is a multinational state containing more than 100 ethnic groups or nationalities. Its largest linguistic and cultural group is the East Slav group which contains about 75 per cent of the total population and includes the bulk of the peoples from the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) and the republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia. Constituting its second largest homogeneous grouping and comprising about 24 million people, or nearly 12 per cent of the nation's inhabitants, are Muslims from the four Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics of Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan, from Kazakhstan S.S.R. and others living within the R.S.F.S.R.<sup>1</sup> These Muslims are closely related to the Islamic peoples of northern Iran, Afghanistan and the Chinese autonomous region of Sinkiang, whose lands are adjoining. Recently, as Russians from west of the Urals moved into the region to staff its nuclear and space complexes and other heavy industrial operations, the large percentage of Muslims in the Central Asian Republics has declined.

Islam has been a significant factor in Central Asian affairs since the tenth century when

it secured many converts from among the peoples of Turkish speech who lived in the vast steppe lands stretching from the Caspian Sea to Mongolia. This area became part of the Mongol empire created by Jenghiz Khan in the thirteenth century and was further Islamized in the fourteenth century, when its Mongol rulers embraced the faith of Mohammed. Once established as a Muslim nation, the Turkic element came to predominate, and a barrier was erected between the Turks of the Khanates and the Russian Slavs, who became increasingly aware of their role as defenders of Orthodox Christendom against Muslim expansion into Eastern Europe. In the sixteenth century, Ivan "the Terrible" succeeded in breaking the hold of the "Golden Horde," beginning a three-hundred-year Russian expansion into Central Asia and a process of Russification which still continues. Czarist Russia viewed her expansion as a holy war waged against the heathen. Contemporary Soviet Communists regard Muslim acceptance of the secular faith of communism as synonymous with their loyalty to the state.<sup>2</sup>

The first two centuries of Russia's eastward expansion were marked by forcible conversions of the Muslims to Christianity, the destruction of mosques, the secularization of religious endowments and the expulsion and deportation of the Turkic peoples from their traditional areas. But in the nineteenth century in somewhat revised form these methods were abandoned in favor of a new approach

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of Labor, *Labor Law and Practice in the U.S.S.R.* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Andrew Malozemoff, *Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), pp. 41-50.



still continued by the Soviet state. This approach seeks either to isolate the Muslims from all outside influence by maintaining them in a state of medieval stagnation, or to modernize them within the Communist framework, removing any possibility of conscious and organized national resistance. Thus Moscow maintains a large group of prosperous and influential Muslim ulama (scholars) who expound the most conservative type of Islamic jurisprudence. Their adjudications supplement the Soviet Union's aim to preserve the most archaic form of Islamic culture in its Muslim communities by isolating them from reformist, nationalist and secularist movements elsewhere in the Islamic world.<sup>3</sup>

### SECURITY DETERMINANTS

Perhaps partially responsible for the transformation in nineteenth century Czarist policy and its continuance by the Soviet Union are geopolitical and security determinants of continuing relevance. Czarist Russia tried to eliminate the possibility of insurrection posed by her suppressed Muslim nationalities. The Muslims were aided and abetted by British agents seeking to establish a sphere of influence in southern Persia and to extend India's frontier northward, while Russia was preoccupied with revolution in her Central Asian borderlands. The Soviet Union's continuance of the Czarist program indicates that it views a Muslim insurrection as a continuing possibility.

The Soviets themselves utilized the services of Muslim cadres to expand their influence among Iranians who were dissatisfied with their central government. Once in the early 1920's and again after the close of the Second

World War in Europe, Soviet Muslims, proselytizing a twisted concept of Islamic unity among Iranians, succeeded temporarily in establishing autonomous states in northern Iran, intended to be affiliated with the U.S.S.R. In 1955, when the West created the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) as a cordon sanitaire against covert Soviet moves into the Middle East, the action was regarded by the U.S.S.R. as a potential threat to its internal security. The pact included four Islamic states proximate to the Soviet border, and a semblance of political unity among Muslim members of the pact might spark a revival of political nationalism and Pan-Islamic fervor in the Soviet Central Asian Republics. Iraq's withdrawal from the pact in 1959, and the present state of increasingly better relations between the Soviet Union and its neighbors to the south have reduced the effectiveness of CENTO.

As a consequence, while the Soviet planners are aware that externally fomented revolution in the U.S.S.R.'s Muslim areas is possible, they also realize that a renewal of the tactics employed by Ivan "the Terrible" could be disastrous. This realization, which led to a revival of Islam in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century, helps to keep it alive there today.<sup>4</sup>

The Soviet Union is aware that the reversal in Czarist policy toward the Muslims failed to isolate them from early twentieth century Pan-Islamic concepts, particularly the notion of Pan-Turanism developed by Turkish intellectuals. Penetration of this concept led to the establishment of revolutionary cadres of Turkic peoples who opposed both the Russian presence and the reactionary Muslim "clergy." However, socialist unity soon transcended and replaced nationalist ambitions as Muslims cooperated temporarily with Bolsheviks to make a common cause against the Czars. But the only theoretical appeals of Marxism to Islam are those aspects of socialism which resemble the Islamic concepts of social justice and morality as the twin objectives of political actions, and other socialist notions which repudiate political democracy in favor of popular democracy, en-

<sup>3</sup> Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, *Islam In The Soviet Union* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 3-18.

<sup>4</sup> An excellent account of Czarist expansion can be found in George Alexander Lensen, *Russia's Eastward Expansion* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 3-137. Soviet imperial aims are described in Victor S. Mamatey, *Soviet Russian Imperialism* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., 1964), pp. 11-110. For a discussion of the origins of the Baghdad Pact see John C. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 44-62.

tailoring economic, social and political liberation for all men.

Impressed with the Bolshevik formula for action, Muslim intellectuals used the Bolshevik plan for agitation and resistance, the conduct of propaganda and the organization of a clandestine cellular structure to pursue their own nationalist cause. Consequently, they failed to heed a special appeal addressed to them in 1917 by the Bolsheviks, promising that Muslim beliefs and customs would be respected and that nationalities would be free to order their own lives. Instead, in 1918, Muslims began a popularly supported revolt against the new Bolshevik government which they regarded as the perpetrator of famine and misery then prevalent in Russia.<sup>5</sup> But in 1923 their revolution collapsed because of dissension and treachery rampant in their ranks. Thereafter the Bolsheviks repudiated their earlier promise of self-determination for non-Russian nationalities and issued a new policy drafted by Josef Stalin which still regulates the lives of Soviet Muslims.

Stalin, once head of the Commissariat of Nationalities, was acutely aware that only the bourgeois intelligentsia was capable of formulating national aspirations. Therefore, his policy limited the principle of self-determination of nations to the "toilers" and refused it to the bourgeoisie. This means that, in the U.S.S.R., nation-building is a purely artificial process imposed from above. However, the incorporation into the Soviet constitution of Stalin's concept of a "correct" nationality policy allows the U.S.S.R. to boast that the Muslim peoples themselves opted to remain as an integral part of the U.S.S.R., "a free federation of nationalities."<sup>6</sup> Actually, the mere existence of a nationality policy indi-

cates the importance the Soviet Union attaches to the nationality factor as a determinant of national power. The U.S.S.R. realizes that a lack of domestic cohesiveness limits a state's capacity to wield effective power beyond its borders.

Generally the Russian Revolution was for Soviet Muslims an opportunity to free themselves from Czarist oppression; most of them have never been absorbed completely by communism. They submit to the central government only because they are convinced that their physical survival necessitates submission. While they continue to accept their fate with resignation, they realize that the salvation of their souls is dependent upon their continued submission to the will of the one God Allah. Consequently, the Soviet Union may inadvertently assist the revival of Islamic domination in Central Asia by spawning some new variety of political nationalism, if it momentarily forgets the behaviorist theory that all men are by nature more anarchic than orderly and as a consequence is no longer regarded by its Muslim peoples as oppressive; or on the other hand, if they no longer regard it as the sole provider and protector of their worldly assets.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, the Soviet Union continues to tolerate the presence of cultural nationalism among its Muslims as compensation for their continued docility and is prepared to use them as cadres to exploit situations of revolutionary promise elsewhere in the Islamic world that might be manipulated to enhance Soviet interests. In a revolutionary situation, it is cadres that count.

## NATIONALISM OR COMMUNISM

However, the U.S.S.R. finds it increasingly difficult to satisfy what its Muslims regard as the essential goal of the Soviet Revolution—the ascendancy of the underdeveloped countries over the industrial societies of Europe. Muslims view the liberation of the colonial people from Czarist oppression and communization as but steps in this process. But the Soviet Union cannot concentrate on leading a revolutionary movement of all its Asian peoples, regardless of class, in a struggle against all Europeans, including the prole-

<sup>5</sup> Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia* (London: The Bodley Head, 1966), pp. 44–56.

<sup>6</sup> *Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, as revised at the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), Section II, "The State Structure," Articles 14–28.

<sup>7</sup> Vernon V. Aspaturian, *The Soviet Union in the World Communist System* (Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1966), pp. 24–27.

ariat, without violating the Marxist doctrines of proletarian internationalism and the all-important class struggle.

The adoption and implementation of such a policy could also lead to a further exacerbation of relations between Peking and Moscow. The recent reassertion of the Russian national identity in the multinational Soviet state compounds Moscow's problem. Russians are once again loudly proclaiming that their historic mission is to defend European civilization against Asians. Today, China's Chairman Mao Tse-tung as Jenghiz Khan incarnate is viewed by Russians as determined to create a "super Orient" that will include portions of the Soviet borderlands. This assertion conjures up memories of Russia's enslavement by the ancestral relatives of her Central Asian Muslims and, if pushed to an extreme, could impair the internal cohesiveness of the U.S.S.R. Previously, in the Soviet Union, expressions of Russian chauvinism were minimized to avoid offending the non-Russian people. Their renewal caused Party First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, speaking at the 23d Congress of the Communist party, to warn against Western efforts to undermine the friendship among the Soviet peoples; party spokesmen for their national republics complained about anti-Russian nationalism in their home territories.<sup>8</sup>

Brezhnev's remarks and similar statements by other Soviet officials seem to indicate that their nationality policy is no longer effective. According to the policy, all ethnic groups within the U.S.S.R.—Muslim or otherwise—that can be associated with a certain territory and separated from their neighbors by certain distinctive economic and cultural characteristics are distinct nations. These nations are described officially as being "fully sovereign," but are not independent in any sense understood in the West. While conceding merit to nationalism outside the U.S.S.R., where it can be utilized to serve Soviet strategic aims,

Moscow condemns and suppresses it within its own borders, only tolerating the presence of a national consciousness that is expressed in a cultural sense without political overtones. The framers of the nationality policy argued that its implementation would help to develop a socialist system of productivity by purging Soviet life of religious, racial and cultural inequality and ending separatist trends among the non-Russians who were only reacting naturally to Russian chauvinism.<sup>9</sup>

However, now that a revival of national mission is spreading among the Russian intelligentsia, the very chauvinism that the nationality policy seeks to suppress could lead to a renewal of political nationalism by Soviet Muslims. Islam, language and a common cultural area and identity could serve as the basis of unity. But any such movement undertaken by Muslims residing in the strategic borderlands of the U.S.S.R. (indicating their preference for Islamic unity rather than Communist solidarity) would undoubtedly be viewed as a serious threat to the internal security of the Soviet Union and promptly crushed. Muslims might then be susceptible to Chinese propagandists advocating Asian unity, an end to Russian domination and the liberation of the "toilers of the East." In addition, Peking could form cadres from among the Turkic nationalities inhabiting the Sinkiang region, who are culturally and linguistically related to peoples of Soviet Central Asia, utilizing them to foment unrest and defiance to continued Soviet rule. Before moving to quell a revival of political nationalism in its Central Asian Republics, the U.S.S.R. might try to determine what effect such an action might have upon its relations with Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa. It is suspected that the Soviets would perhaps tolerate some development of political nationalism among their Muslims rather than risk a probable loss of prestige in the Middle East, enhancing Maoist interests. But the best solution is for the U.S.S.R. to find a way to curb Russian nationalism; otherwise the limited autonomy exercised by Soviet Muslims will not satisfy

<sup>8</sup> Paul Wohl, "Russians sight national goal: to halt spread of Maoism," in *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 6, 1967, p. 16.

<sup>9</sup> Frederick L. Schuman, *Government in the Soviet Union* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1967), pp. 108-116.

their nationalist craving. It is becoming evident that the cultural autonomy tolerated within the U.S.S.R. is a precarious way to satisfy nationalist demands, since nationalist revolutionaries regard political and cultural matters as inseparable.<sup>10</sup>

### COMMUNIST SUPPRESSION

Soviet leaders have always recognized the limitations of their nationality policy and have surreptitiously sought to modify and eventually to eliminate Islam in the U.S.S.R. Attacking the fundamental Islamic concept of belief in God, the Soviets tolerate those aspects of its traditional social, educational and judicial system that retard modernization and nationalism. Muslim affairs are supervised by the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults attached to the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and staffed with loyal Communists. In addition, Moscow has drastically restricted the number of Muslim religious officials and functioning mosques. Some superficial aspects of Islam such as the veiling of women and certain festivals are also discouraged.

The Islamic educational system, consisting of primary schools attached to the mosques, has been completely replaced by the Soviet system of primary and secondary education which concentrates on a general and technical curriculum organized on purely secular lines. The teaching of religion in any state, public or private educational institution where general educational subjects are taught is inadmissible. Basically, Soviet policy seeks to expedite the absorption of Muslims into the U.S.S.R.; as a consequence, the literacy and higher education standards of the Central Asian Republics exceed those of any other Asian or African area, excepting Japan and Israel.<sup>11</sup>

One of the more successful Soviet assaults

upon Islam was the replacement of Arabic script by the Latin alphabet. This was envisaged as one way to isolate Soviet Muslims from their coreligionists to the South and to undermine Islam, whose sacred and legal texts are all written in Arabic script. In 1938, this program was extended further by the issuance of a decree requiring that the Russian language be taught in all non-Russian schools and that the Cyrillic alphabet replace the Latin letters. Although the language reform was not completed until after the end of World War II, it has since succeeded in transforming a multiplicity of languages into one national language establishing Russian as a second native language.

Concerning Muslim literature, Moscow continues to follow the Stalinist policy of creating "national literature" written in the national language but in Cyrillic script. However, all writings must conform to literary criteria established by the Communist party for the whole of the Soviet Union, which specifies that literature must be "national in form but socialist in content." Consequently, all literature serves as a vehicle for official propaganda on carefully restricted subjects.<sup>12</sup>

### IDEOLOGICAL DISPARITY

Regardless of all the measures enacted to suppress Islam within the Soviet Union, complete Sovietization has not been achieved. Most Central Asians still readily admit to being Muslim and the Islamic peoples in areas reached by the Germans in World War II sided with the invaders by engaging in activities openly hostile to the Soviet regime. Perhaps the Muslims continue to find more relevance in Islamic thought than in Communist ideology, although they are not dissimilar. Both try to implement a social ideal by building a society where historical develop-

(Continued on page 174)

<sup>10</sup> One of the best accounts of the relationship of nationalism to internal politics can be found in Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 92-140.

<sup>11</sup> Wheeler, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-108.

<sup>12</sup> Donald W. Treadgold, *Twentieth Century Russia* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966), pp. 207-211 and pp. 302-304.

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*"Israel's presence in the Middle East is not accepted by Palestinian Arabs or by the neighboring countries comprising the heartland of the Arab Muslim world." Unfortunately, "in an area saturated with tragedy, one of the saddest results of this endless state of war is that the war with Israel itself is made to substitute for a beneficial and needed social revolution in the Arab countries."*

## Israel in the Islamic World: A Hundred Years' War

BY DWIGHT JAMES SIMPSON

*Professor of International Relations, San Francisco State College*

IN MAY OF 1969, the state of Israel will have been in existence for 21 years. Never during this period has it been possible for Israel to achieve her most wanted objective: peace with her Arab neighbors. Two decades of statehood have brought three wars with the Arab countries, an incessant round of border incidents, Arab guerrilla raids, and punitive Israeli counteractions. All of these have made necessary, in Israeli judgment, the creation in Israel of a military machine so overwhelmingly powerful that it has achieved an unbroken string of smashing victories over the relatively ineffective Arab armies, particularly those of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria.

The extent to which Israeli society has been militarized was shown very clearly at the beginning of 1969 by Israeli Finance Minister Zeev Sharef. The Finance Minister told the *Knesset* (Parliament) that the equivalent of \$840 million—slightly more than 40 per cent of the total 1969–1970 national budget—would go for military procurement and general defense expenditures. To Americans who spend that much for one fully-equipped aircraft carrier, \$840 million may seem unimpressive. But to Israelis, to whom \$840 million represents nearly one-fourth of their country's projected gross national product for 1969–1970, the figure is stupefying. Ob-

viously 20 years of statehood has meant the gradual conversion of Israel into a highly militarized, semi-garrison state. How far this result differs from the intentions of the original Zionist leaders and pioneers who went to Palestine in the early part of this century scarcely needs emphasizing.

What seems an accurate projection of the future is that Israel is in the twentieth year of what may be a Middle East version of a hundred years' war. Israel's presence in the Middle East is not accepted by Palestinian Arabs or by the neighboring countries comprising the heartland of the Arab Muslim world. Simply stated, this is the fundamental, and wholly intractable, issue at the root of the unending Middle East crisis.

Many factors, of course, can and do work to soften or to deflect Arab non-acceptance of Israel's presence. These factors include a liberal Israeli policy for administering large areas still occupied by Palestinian Arabs, conflicts within the leadership of the Arab world itself, and the diplomatic maneuvering of the great powers in an attempt to induce or force the warring Arabs and Jews into a peace settlement. Notwithstanding these elements, however, at all levels of society throughout the Arab world there is massive inbred hostility, fear and hatred toward Israel. It is of course true that many Arab politicians have based



their careers on a fomenting of this anti-Israel feeling and they have stimulated an incessant barrage of officially directed propaganda intended to inflame the Arab masses. But it is also true that the population of the Arab world, for whatever reasons, is almost uniformly hostile to Israel. This is a fact and it is unlikely to change.

And it must be understood clearly that this Arab hostility has considerable justification. For Jews throughout the world the establishment, in 1948, of the state of Israel signified the end of the Diaspora and the beginning of the great *Aliyah* (Return) to Zion. In the long and brilliant history of the Jewish people no event has had a more profound psychological and moral impact on Judaism's believers. Linked as it was with the sufferings of Europe's Jews at the hands of the German Nazis, the Return was so sacred an opportunity that it was as if Jehovah himself had provided it. This story is well-known and much-admired in the Christian West and it has served as the basis for much of the continuing Western approval and support of Israel's position and policies.

The less well known story concerns the Arabs, both of Palestine and of adjacent Arab countries. To Arabs, the *Aliyah*, or great Return, was simply the great Invasion. What the Jews and their supporters described as nation-building and benign social engineering was to the Arabs simply the forcible occupation of their lands and a deprivation of their rights in an area where they had lived for a thousand years. The Arabs see themselves as twentieth century victims of a slightly modified form of an age-old imperialism. They see the Jews of Israel as alien outsiders who, by use of force, established a figurative beach-head in the heart of the Arab world in 1948 and who, in the ensuing 20 years, have used additional force to enlarge their territorial conquest to several times its original size.

The Arabs remain wholly unimpressed by the Israeli argument of historical Jewish "claims" to Palestine or by the companion Israeli thesis that Westernized, modern, technically efficient Israel can serve as a boon to the future lives of the comparatively back-

ward Arab population. The Arabs feel that these arguments are simply dissimulations which cannot hope to conceal from the perceptive observer the reality of the situation. The Arabs also know that historically all imperialist powers have resorted to slogans and phrases which sought to put a good face on their territory grabbing. "Manifest Destiny" was meant to explain why it was a good thing for the United States to grab an already occupied continent and even to extend its power and control to non-contiguous territories in the Pacific. The "White Man's Burden" and "*mission civilisatrice*" were offered by Great Britain and France as compelling reasons why their nations should seize and control huge territories inhabited by others. Even the rapacious Adolph Hitler developed the infamous "*lebensraum*" theory to explain the necessity for dispossessing neighboring "inferior" races.

#### ISRAELI NATIONALISM

Israeli statebuilding required politics and Israeli politics bred a virulent Israeli nationalism. Consequently, the struggle in the Middle East is essentially a struggle between two uncompromising nationalisms—Israeli and Arab—for control of a small strip of land called Palestine. The Arab nationalism, speaking in Wilsonian accents which stress self-determination and freedom from alien control, proclaims simply that Palestine is rightfully Arab and must be restored to Arab control. Israeli nationalism states, to the contrary, that Israel is an irreversible fact and that there is no Palestine. Obviously, no resolution of the conflict is possible when it is understood in these terms. And the basic fact of the Middle East is that these indeed are the understandings of the Arabs and the Israelis.

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Dwight James Simpson has had many years of experience in the Middle East. He served as president of Robert College, Istanbul, in 1966–1967. He was chairman of the Area Studies Program at Williams College and taught political science at the University of California at Berkeley.

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## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

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# 1969 State of the Union Message

*On the evening of January 14, President Lyndon B. Johnson presented his final "State of the Union" message to the United States Congress. Excerpts from this address follow:*

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Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, members of the Congress and my fellow Americans.

For the sixth and the last time, I present to the Congress my assessment of the state of the Union.

I shall speak to you tonight about challenge and opportunity, and about the commitments that all of us have made together that will, if we carry them out, give America our best chance to achieve the kind of a Great Society that we all want.

Every President lives, not only with what is, but with what has been, and what could be.

Most of the great events in his Presidency are part of a larger sequence extending back through several years and extending back through several other Administrations.

Urban unrest, poverty, pressures on welfare, education of our people, law enforcement and law and order, the continuing crisis in the Middle East, the conflict in Vietnam, the dangers of nuclear war, the great difficulties of dealing with the Communist powers—all have this much in common:

They and their causes—the causes that gave rise to them—all of these have existed with us for many years. Several Presidents have already sought to try to deal with them. One or more Presidents will try to resolve them or try to contain them in the years that are ahead of us.

But if the nation's problems are continuing, so are this great nation's assets:

Our economy, the democratic system, our sense of exploration symbolized most recently by the wonderful flight of the Apollo 8 in

which all Americans took great pride, and the good common sense and sound judgment of the American people and their essential love of justice.

We must not ignore our problems, but neither should we ignore our strengths. Those strengths are available to sustain a President of either party, to support his progressive efforts both at home and overseas.

• • •

We have finished a major part of the old agenda. Some of the laws that we wrote have already, in front of our eyes, taken on the flesh of achievement. Medicare, that we were unable to pass for so many years, is now a part of American life. Voting rights and the voting booth that we debated so long back in the '50's, and the doors to public service—are open at last to all Americans regardless of their color.

Schools and schoolchildren all over America tonight are receiving Federal assistance to go to good schools. And pre-school education—Head Start—is already here to stay. And, I think, so are the Federal programs that tonight are keeping more than a million and a half of the cream of our young people in the colleges and universities of this country.

Part of the American earth—and not only in description on a map, but in the reality of our shores and our hills and our parks and our forests and our mountains—has been permanently set aside for the American public and for their benefit. And there's more going to be set aside before this Administration ends.

*(Continued on page 179)*

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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### The Middle East

**MAKERS OF ARAB HISTORY.** By PHILIP K. HITTI. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968. 256 pages and index, \$6.95.)

This history is designed to give students and interested laymen an overview of Arab history through an examination of the lives of the most prominent Arab religious, political and intellectual leaders. Professor Philip Hitti, the dean of American orientalist, has succeeded ably in his task of presenting complicated and often seemingly contradictory religious, social and political forces in a brief, well-written and interesting narrative. This study is concerned with the lives and thoughts of seven religious and political leaders; it encompasses a period from the seventh century A.D. and the life of the prophet Mohammed to the time of the crusades and the life of Saladin (Salah al-Din). Ibn Khaldun, the last scholar whose life and ideas are discussed, lived in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and is considered by many the father of modern sociology. This study is highly recommended for those who are looking for the results of extensive research in voluminous primary sources, in capsule form.

Michael H. Van Dusen  
The Middle East Institute  
American University

**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONAL COOPERATION: KUWAIT.** By RAGAEI EL MALLAKH. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968. xxi + 239 pages, tables, bibliography and index, \$7.75.)

Until very recently it has been the fashion in Middle Eastern studies to publish economic volumes documenting the widening gap in the area between the "haves" and the "have nots"—that is, those countries with oil and few people,

and those with people and no oil. The unfortunate result has been that many more significant regional economic problems have not been adequately treated. This pioneering work by Ragaei El Mallakh deals with new and important economic issues in the Middle East. In an uncomplicated and enjoyable style, El Mallakh explains the various facets of the highly viable economy and highly sophisticated economic planning that exists in oil-rich, welfare-oriented Kuwait. He also discusses at length the regional economic cooperation and foreign aid to other Arab states that has resulted from Kuwait's efforts not only to develop her more backward neighbors, but also to maintain the level of development which Kuwait has achieved. It is obvious that Kuwaiti oil has made this economic success story possible. However, an equally important factor in Kuwait's efficient economy was the recent discovery and rapid and continuous development of the oil industry. Thus Kuwait has avoided the economic stops and starts which have stymied so many other attempts at development in the Middle East.

M.H.V.D.

**EGYPT: MILITARY SOCIETY.** By ANOUAR ABDEL-MALEK. (New York: Random House, 1968. xlii + 383 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$8.95.)

Anouar Abdel-Malek is an Egyptian Christian and socialist who worked hard for the success of the Egyptian national revolution inaugurated by President Nasser in 1952. However, he left Egypt in 1959, disillusioned with the course that the revolution had taken, and apprehensive of the military society that had been created by the ruling military clique. *Egypt: Military Society* is a detailed and coherent story of the social, economic and political developments that occurred in Egypt between 1952

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## ISLAM AND THE WEST IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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imacy of the entire political system. The ideologically oriented parties began to rise to prominence in the 1930's. Their birth once again testified to the penetration of ideas from outside into the world of Islam. There were fascist and proto-fascist movements (Ahmed Hussein's Green Shirts in Egypt and the Wafd's counter-organization, the Blue Shirts).<sup>23</sup> There were Socialist parties (the *Ahali* and the National-Democrats in Iraq,<sup>24</sup> the Ba'ath and other socialist groups in Syria,<sup>25</sup> the National-Socialists in Jordan, the Socialist Progressive party in Lebanon.<sup>26</sup>) There were Communist parties whose status was enhanced in the 1940's following the Soviet Union's victorious emergence from the trials of World War II. And last but not least, there was the Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood.

### THE IDEOLOGICAL PHASE: MAIN TRENDS

In this welter of conflicting ideologies, three broad trends could be discerned: (a) the basic Westernizing orientation; (b) the

<sup>23</sup> For this period, see Marcel Colombe, *L'Évolution de l'Égypte, 1924-1950* (Paris: G. P. Maisonneuve, 1951); also Jean et Simone Lacouture, *L'Égypte en Mouvement* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1956).

<sup>24</sup> Majid Khadduri, *Independent Iraq from 1932 to 1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960).

<sup>25</sup> Kamel S. Abu Jaber, *The Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization* (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966).

<sup>26</sup> Lucien George and Toufic Mokdessi, *Les Partis Libanais en 1959* (Beirut: Editions L'Orient—Al-Jarida, n.d.).

<sup>27</sup> Ideas of these Westernizers may be found in: Khalid M. Khalid, *From Here We Start* (1953); Taha Hussein, *The Future of Culture in Egypt* (1954); and Mirrit Boutros Ghali, *The Policy of Tomorrow* (1953); all published by the American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D. C.

<sup>28</sup> Ideas of these Islamic reformers are analyzed in H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947); and Malcolm H. Kerr, *Islam Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966).

<sup>29</sup> Christina Phelps Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1964); also Ishak Musa Husaini, *The Moslem Brethren* (Beirut: Khayat's, 1956).

Islamic orientation; and (c) an orientation rejecting both Islam and Western democracy and aiming at a new type of society and government. In spite of criticisms directed at democracy as unsuited for local conditions, corrupted in actual practice and too cumbersome to assure speedy development, Western orientation found eloquent defenders even in the post-World War II era. In their writings, Egypt's Taha Hussein, Khalid M. Khalid, and Boutros Ghali made a strong plea for their countrymen to follow Western patterns, to eschew religious concepts of government as leading to corruption and tyranny, and to recognize the affinity of the Eastern Mediterranean civilization with that of the West, as contrasted with its conflicts with the civilization of the mystical Orient.<sup>27</sup>

The Islamic orientation presented a complex picture. First of all, it drew inspiration from earlier movements aiming at the reform of Islam as a religious and ethical system. On the one hand, there were fundamentalist approaches such as the puritan Wahhabi in Arabia and the Senussi in Libya. On the other, there was a legacy left by such thinkers as Jamal ed-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh in Egypt who—while trying to purify Islam of noxious accretions—were aware of the need to adjust it to the demands of modern times and to reconcile it with science and Western-inspired rationalism.<sup>28</sup>

But by the late 1930's, social and political tension in Egypt was so pronounced that a more vigorous approach was needed to make Islam attractive. Such an approach was offered by Hassan al-Banna, the dynamic founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. His program was both fundamentalist and progressive. The political aspects of the program were vague, referring to the need to recreate an Islamic theocratic state. But the social program took cognizance of the socio-economic ills of the Egyptian and, more broadly, the Arab society. It called for a number of practical measures characteristic of a tightly organized and centrally directed social welfare state.<sup>29</sup>

The third trend—rejection of both the Islamic and the democratic models—did not

represent a unified world outlook. It embraced such diverse ideologies as communism, fascism and socialism. Their common denominator was the conviction that the existing system was bankrupt and illegitimate, and that drastic solutions involving dictatorial methods and mobilization of masses were required to achieve liberation from imperialism, social justice and economic development.

Groups of impatient younger officers in some of the Arab armies shared the belief in the necessity of drastic means but were uncommitted ideologically. They (rather than the ideologues) carried out a series of coups and revolutions which, except in Lebanon and in the monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, toppled the existing parliamentary or traditional regimes (in Syria in 1949 and again in 1962–1963, in Egypt in 1952, in Iraq in 1958, and in Yemen in 1961). On two occasions, however, the military cooperated with an ideological party—the Ba'ath: in Syria in February, 1963, and in Iraq in March of that year—the latter coup removing not a democracy but a previous military dictatorship.

In due course, Cairo and Damascus emerged as two principal centers of Arab revolution. Cairo—under U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser's charismatic leadership—tended to be pragmatically inclined and it took ten years (1952–1962) for it to define its goals in an ideological document called the National Charter.<sup>30</sup> Damascus, on the other hand, was the headquarters of the Pan-Arab-oriented Ba'ath party which from the very outset was committed to a socialist and nationalist program. The founders of the Ba'ath, Michel Aflaq and Salah ed-Din al-Bitar, both educated in France, initially contemplated a democratic socialism while preaching the need for revolution. Once in power (sharing it with army officers) they soon abandoned the democratic pretense, instituting a one-party regime in Syria and resorting to methods typical of modern dictatorships.

<sup>30</sup> United Arab Republic, *Draft of the Charter* (Cairo: Information Department, 1962).

The main differences between their system and that prevailing in Egypt could be defined as: (a) the practice of collective leadership as contrasted with Nasser's one-man rule; (b) the genuineness of their party organization as contrasted with the artificiality of Nasser's single party, the Arab Socialist Union. Otherwise, both regimes displayed marked similarities. Ideologically, they agreed on three fundamentals: secularly tinged Arab nationalism in its Pan-Arab version; rejection of the Western political patterns (parliamentarism and multiplicity of parties) as socially divisive and leading to imperialist infiltration; and Arab socialism, conceived as a socio-economic system combining a dominant public sector with a subordinate private sector.

This type of socialism was to differ from both the Western and the Soviet socialist models: from the Western model, in that it did not approve of anti-nationalism and compromises with imperialism; from the Soviet model, in that it rejected class warfare, militant atheism and the inhuman pace of Soviet industrialization. Arab revolutionary ideology (also evident in such countries as Iraq, Algeria, Yemen and the recently established People's Republic of South Yemen) could thus be viewed as eclectic: it borrowed selectively from Western and Soviet models (from nationalism and planned economy respectively), while making adjustments to local conditions and, to some extent, to traditions.

In adopting and applying their revolutionary programs, Arab military leaders and their civilian allies have tended to assume that they have found the right formula to emancipate their countries from dependence on foreign powers, to assure fast economic development and to provide for social justice. In reality, they have promoted a paradox expressed in the dualism of rationalism and irrationality. Careful economic planning on a much advertised "scientific" basis as well as the development of adequate military strength to shield their republics from external aggression and internal opposition require an emphasis on rationalism. At the same time, the



cultivation of the militant nationalist myth and the maintenance of an illiberal power structure demand the suppression of free debate, censorship, the distortion of truth, high selectivity in the government-sponsored flow of news, the rewriting of old and recent history, the creation of idols and taboos, and continuous appeals to emotion rather than to reason. A typical American political science curriculum containing courses on parties and pressure groups, the growth of public law through legislation and judicial review, the separation of powers and civilian supremacy, electoral behavior, and a critical analysis of national foreign policy would today be unthinkable in the universities of the Arab revolutionary camp.

The absence of any effective mechanism of peaceful change enhances the rulers' obsession with power; causes them to think and act in terms of always present dangers of encirclement, conspiracy and subversion; and induces them to divert increasing amounts of mental energy and material resources from development programs to the maintenance of the coercive apparatus. While this phenomenon is, to some extent, characteristic of any authoritarian system, modern dictatorships lack the more firmly anchored legitimacy of traditionally-inclined monarchies and thus are obliged to live in a state of perpetual insecurity.

The defeat suffered in June, 1967, by the Arab states at the hands of a smaller but more rationally organized Israel indicates that the Arab revolutionary elites may well rethink the premises on which they have shaped their domestic and foreign policies. Two of the defeated states—Egypt and Syria—have been the main exponents of the need for mobilizing their societies under the aegis of the army or of a single political party, while curtailing political freedoms and rational discussion.

The Middle East battlefields provided a significant test of these theories. The question remains whether reforms, of which one hears so much these days in Cairo, will be restricted to externals or will address themselves to the root causes of weakness.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

*(Continued from page 169)*

and 1962. The book is a translation of an edition which appeared in French in 1962; the author has added a 40-page preface in this 1968 English edition. Until 1959, when a crackdown on leftists forced him to leave the country, Abdel-Malek was a perceptive, on-the-spot observer of the events that took place during the early years of the revolution. Events between 1959 and 1962 are treated peripherally, and those since 1962 are hardly mentioned. As a socialist and a Marxist, Abdel-Malek sees little hope for Egypt under the leadership of the military class which, in his view, is trying to build a socialist state without socialists. But if the military nature of Egyptian society today threatens the continuing success of the national revolution, the June, 1967, war has endangered the position of the military elite and has virtually ruined 15 years of hard-won achievements.

M.H.V.D.

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## POLITICS AND ISLAM IN NORTH AFRICA

*(Continued from page 140)*

ables to provide guidelines for the future. Consequently, prediction would be foolhardy.

However, several factors are likely to shape the future of Islam.

The extent to which the present generation of leaders is able to reconcile the traditional and non-traditional segments of national societies. Because of the diversity of these segments, common values will be eclectic and consensus in politics will be fragile at best.

The degree to which such interest groups as rebellious youth, the military, the urban proletariat, and the peasantry can be enlisted to support non-ideological goals.

The extent to which France will provide material and cultural support to North Africa in the post-Gaullist period.

The ability of religious heads of communities to select appropriate goals not in the abstract

but in the context of episodic crises and moral uncertainty.

The prudent observer cannot end on an apocalyptic note. Islam has proven itself a resilient spiritual force in the Arab world. In the face of the profound changes taking place in North Africa one cannot be certain what new forms it will assume. However, to the extent that its practitioners do not embrace rigid mannerisms, or fall back upon fundamentalist codes, Islam will continue to be a living religion for the vast majority of North Africans.

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## ISLAM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

(Continued from page 150)

isolated and studied apart from the other forces at work. Even in areas such as Somalia and the Sudan Republic, which are preponderantly Muslim and where Islam is a manifest factor, it is tempered and manipulated by other political, social and economic phenomena. Islam's role in African politics, then, is a function of and subordinate to many other variables, for politics is, for the most part, derived from bases other than religious.

## ISLAM IN MODERNIZING AFRICA

There are several trends in African Islam which must be noted as a prelude to any discussion of Islam in the context of its role in emerging Africa. First is the superficial nature of belief on the part of many Africans, especially the neo-Muslims. Vernon McKay quotes a Muslim leader in Africa to the effect that the main concern is not that the new converts be faithful in their devotions, but that their children be sent to the Koranic schools.<sup>15</sup> Thus, the depth of belief may increase with time, but at present it is not always great. Second, the trend toward secularization of the state is pronounced among the modern African nations and among their political elite. The political and

legal systems of Islam are therefore not a direct factor within the structure of the modern nation-state system, even in areas which are preponderantly Muslim, and most likely will not achieve any significant role. Even in areas where the *Sharia* has been in force, the trend is increasingly to relegate it to cases of personal status, and Western-style civil codes are being superimposed. Finally, there is a tendency, particularly among the neo-Muslims, to divorce Islamic culture from religion. Hence, while Islam is making many converts, the spread of the Islamic way of life, with its concomitant social and political implications, is negligible.

However, in areas where Islam is well entrenched it has in the past served as a major socio-political force, giving to many areas a common culture and language, a unified code of law, and a sense of community, thus helping to bridge the gap between tribalism and regionalism, and preparing the way for a more fully integrated nation-state. Furthermore, although the day of the Islamic state is past, as the modern African nationalists seek to draw upon their own rich heritage to preserve the "African personality," the great African Islamic states and empire of the past will serve as an inspiration.

Although the trend in Africa is toward secularization and complete separation of church and state, this does not necessarily subsume a separation of religion and politics. Even in the West, where the separation of church and state is most pronounced and religion is not a direct or manifest influence, values and ideas derived from religion do serve as a background or latent force. As for religion and politics, we need only consider the importance of the "Jewish vote" in American politics, or the issue of President John F. Kennedy's Catholicism during the 1960 presidential campaign. So Islam, too, will continue to have its relevance in African politics, particularly as the democratic ideal of "one man, one vote" is instituted. Here, wherever the Muslim community is somewhat cohesive, parties or pressure groups espousing Muslim interests are likely to evolve.

<sup>15</sup> Vernon McKay, "The Impact of Islam on Relations Among the New African States," in *Islam and International Relations*, ed. J. Harris Proctor (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 161.

There is one final point worth consideration. At present the Muslim communities in sub-Saharan Africa are primarily conservative and obscurantist forces, particularly in West Africa, where they are among the most backward *vis-à-vis* their non-Muslim counterparts. This is in no small way due to the traditional religious elite, represented by the upper echelons of the Sufi orders' hierarchy, who fear that the processes of modernization and secularization threaten the Islamic way of life.

But as Islamic reformist and modernist influences begin to penetrate Africa—forces which are already fomenting outside the continent—African Islam may become reconciled with the modern world and could potentially be one of the conveyors of progress. Al-Ahzar University in Cairo, the oldest and foremost school of Islam, is already beginning to dispense a more liberal and potent interpretation of Islam under United Arab Republic President Gamal Abdel Nasser's direction. And the number of sub-Saharan African students in attendance there is increasing yearly. Only time will reveal the impact of these "enlightened" and often militant African Muslims.

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## INDONESIA: "ANOTHER COMMUNIST DISASTER"

(Continued from page 160)

the jungles to undertake actions against regular units of the Army and the Police. . . . The result was that the Communist movement in Indonesia suffered another disaster.<sup>30</sup>

Essentially, then, the central dispute between Moscow and Peking is not whether the Malay world should or should not—to borrow Khrushchev's phrase—be "buried," but the best way to go about the job. Thus, in attacking the Chinese posture on Indonesia, the Soviets argue that armed struggle can be successful only when it has been studiously planned and has popular support. In other words, Moscow accuses the Indonesian and

Chinese Communists of acting prematurely.

This has special significance in Indonesia because the P.K.I. leadership has invariably claimed that a reason for the failure of the September 30 affair three years ago was that the power play was "premature." The Indonesian Communists offered the same rationalization for their failure at armed insurrection at Madiun 17 years earlier.

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## TURKEY: A CONTEMPORARY SURVEY

(Continued from page 145)

the grave issues of the day. With the continuation of social change, new elements have emerged whose interests lie with the principles of political freedom, however rough and arduous the road toward achievement. Perhaps, as Bernard Lewis has suggested, most important of all, the Turkish people have demonstrated qualities of "self-reliance, responsibility and civic courage," based not merely on a great imperial past, but on the knowledge and experience of contemporary achievement. It is doubtful that they will return either to "the ancient habits of autocracy and acquiescence" or turn toward a dictatorship of the right or left.

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## ISLAM IN THE SOVIET UNION

(Continued from page 165)

ment can be regulated, allowing man to experience life in a correctly ordered human community. But for the Communist, history is exclusively concerned with the material world; nothing is relevant except the history that he is convinced must evolve. Human life has no meaning—except as a contributor or obstacle to the Communist interpretation of historical evolution—and no reality except in the "clouded realm of philosophical fantasy." Consequently, communism sanctions the exploitation of the human person by the state if this action advances the Communist view of the historical process.

In contrast, while Islam also recognizes that the creation of a proper communal life

<sup>30</sup> See "Malay Conflicts: Red Setbacks Split Moscow, Peking," in the *Los Angeles Times*, October 9, 1968.

in this world is of great importance if social justice is to be realized by all men, it further stipulates that every human action has both an eternal and a temporal impact. Although it regards life as a great collective drama of interaction, Islam specifies that each individual at the day of judgment will be accountable for his personal contribution. Islam, utilizing both a collective and singular historical approach, seeks heaven both in this world and in the hereafter and declares that the prime function of society is to prepare the individual for his spiritual rewards and to function within a temporal community of his fellows. Muslims believe that the historical process of the collective is ultimately less significant than the individual's preparation for another world beyond the grave.<sup>13</sup>

The Islamic interpretation of history is not reconcilable with the fundamental Communist concept that man has no reality as an individual, but only as a member of a social class. Consequently, many Soviet Muslims probably submit to Moscow only because of the constant reminder that the Communist threat to the survival of their bodies is more imminent and real than the Islamic conception of the Last Judgment. Thus, while the likelihood of a successful revolution by Muslims against Soviet rule is remote, the integration of the Muslim communities into a Communist society is also unlikely.

<sup>13</sup> For a comparative study of Islamic thought and Communist ideology see Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 156-195 and Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam In Modern History* (New York: Mentor Books, 1957), pp. 30-34.

## THE MUSLIMS OF PAKISTAN AND INDIA

(Continued from page 155)

taneously. A Muslim can divorce his wife orally at his sole discretion without reference to a court. Another objectionable feature of the personal law is the rule that a grandson cannot inherit the property of his grandfather, if his own father is dead.<sup>16</sup> Practically every Muslim country has changed some of

these anomalous medieval laws; yet in India in 1963 the Muslims successfully thwarted the government's attempt to appoint a committee to consider the reforms which the Muslim countries have introduced in their personal law. The Indian government obviously wanted to change Muslim personal law. The negative reaction of the Indian Muslims to this proposal led the Indian government to assure the Muslims that it would not change the Muslim personal law.

In contrast, in 1961, the government of Pakistan enacted the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, which among other reforms forbade polygamous marriages, except with the permission of an Arbitration Council. Divorce could not be pronounced without reference to the Arbitration Council, which could also decree equitable maintenance for the divorced wife. The minimum marriageable age for girls was raised from 14 to 16. Indian Muslims, however, contend that even these beneficial changes in the Muslim personal law would set a precedent for governmental interference in their cultural affairs. Many of the reforms, they maintain, are being enforced by the consensus of the community.

Muslims in both countries have adopted a receptive attitude towards scientific education and technology. Even religious traditionalists in India—the leaders and intellectuals of the *Jamā'at-i Islami*—unequivocally state:

For the Muslims to acquire scientific knowledge and skill is in fact to revive a cherished Islamic tradition that no Muslim could relinquish without actually relinquishing a part of his religion.<sup>17</sup>

Can a traditional society encourage scientific education while it consistently fosters obscurantism in education? "By obscurantism," says S. Alam Khundmiri,

I mean that attitude of mind which resists the spirit of free inquiry and prefers to remain con-

<sup>16</sup> Cf. A. G. Noorani, "Secularism and Muslim Personal Law," *Opinion* (Bombay), May, 1967, p. 27.

<sup>17</sup> Mohammad Imran, "Islam's Attitude Towards Science," *Radiance* (Delhi) September 22, 1968, p. 6.

fined within a narrow limit of tradition, even when it hampers further growth and development of personality. . . .<sup>18</sup>

In both countries, certain traditional elements, while paying lip service to scientific education, maintain an untenable distinction between scientific learning and the spirit of science or a rational view of life. In India, one sees the promotion of obscurantism in the textbooks of government-owned secondary and primary schools; they also contain statements most likely to generate anti-Muslim sentiments among the Hindus.

Calling such texts to the attention of Sampurnanand, the chairman of the Emotional Integration Committee of the Uttar Pradesh government (also for some years the Minister of Education), the Indian Muslims' *Dini Ta'lim* Council (the Religious Educational Council) maintained that the insertion of Hindu mythology in public school textbooks is not only against article 28 (1) of the Indian Constitution, but also promotes obscurantism and anti-Muslim sentiments. Dismissing this criticism, Sampurnanand commented that

if Hindus, Muslims, Christians and others are to come closer to each other they should know one another's beliefs, mythological or otherwise. In this way they can learn not to tread on each others' toes.<sup>19</sup>

## ISLAM IN PAKISTAN

In Pakistan, the battle between the modernists and the traditionalists also rages. While they have achieved a consensus regarding the desirability of capitalism as an economic system, they are in conflict with regard to certain fundamental Islamic convictions, i.e., the doctrine of revelation and the Koran, and the issue of interest in banking. The constitution of Pakistan (1962) created The Islamic Research Institute in order to advise the government "in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis." It was also called on "to interpret the teachings

of Islam in such a way as to bring out its dynamic character in the context of the intellectual and scientific progress of the modern world." Fazlur-Rahmān, a former associate professor of Islamic Studies at McGill University's Institute of Islamic Studies, was appointed as the director. Since his appointment about five years ago, Rahmān has courageously endeavored to loosen some Islamic laws and institutions from their medieval moorings.

In 1963, an intense controversy took place in Pakistan on the subject of Rahmān's article "*Riba* and Interest," which he had presented at Princeton University. *Riba* refers to the problem of interest and usury against which there is a Koranic prohibition. The precise nature of this prohibition has been mooted by Islamic scholars for centuries without achieving an acceptable view. Recently, the traditionalists have written treatises purporting to show that interest-free banking is feasible not only in Pakistan but in the modern world. Rahmān's interpretation maintains a dichotomy between *Riba* (usury) which is prohibited, and commercial interest against which there is no Koranic injunction. The traditionalist ulama (religious scholars) accept no distinction.

Regarding the revelation and the Koran, the traditionalists believe that the Koran was dictated to the Prophet Mohammed by a physically-present angel Gabriel and that the dictation is word-for-word the message of God. According to Rahmān, the Koran came to Mohammed just as inspiration "comes from beyond" to a poet or thinker; he cited, as an example, Einstein discovering the theory of relativity. In the process of revelation, the Koran is "ultimately related to the personality of the Prophet." In the summer of 1968 a storm of protest against this modern interpretation was raised by the ulama; fundamentalist mobs stoned buses and public property in West Pakistan. To save the government from becoming the target of religious wrath, Rahmān resigned, and modernity was set back in Pakistan.

Despite a wide gulf separating the traditionalists and the modernists, they both see

<sup>18</sup> S. Alam Khundmiri, "Obscurantism and The Indian Situation," *Secular Democracy* (New Delhi), February, 1968, p. 8.

<sup>19</sup> Letter of Sampurnanand to A. J. Faridi, August 31, 1961, in *Communal Riots and National Integration* (Lucknow: 1962), pp. 25-30.



capitalism as the economic system best suited to Pakistan. Practically all schools of thought and politics have produced ideological economic models, sometimes styled as Islamic socialism, an Islamic welfare system or an Islamic economy. All, however, subscribe to capitalism. Some intellectuals contend that Islam in reality advocates capitalism with certain reservations. Free enterprise should be regulated only to protect individual rights because Islam does not condone the exploitation of man by man in the name of a free contract. The law of nature maintains inequality in human endowments and no amount of egalitarian endeavor could eliminate this intrinsic inequality.

Space does not permit a complete review of the various economic models presented in Pakistan, although they have been extensively discussed by this author elsewhere.<sup>20</sup> It can, however, be stated that in the intellectual climate of Pakistan, capitalism has achieved much greater acceptance than elsewhere in Asia, and continued peace might allow it to plant deeper roots. Like early nineteenth century Japan, the constitutionally authoritarian political system of Pakistan seems to be determined to modernize Muslim society by creating an amalgam of updated traditional and modern values—a sort of mutually supportive dualism—in which the relationship between the two value systems would be symbolic rather than antagonistic.

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<sup>20</sup> Hafeez Malik, "*The Spirit of Capitalism and Pakistani Islam*," presented at XXVII International Congress of Orientalists, Ann Arbor, Michigan, August 15, 1967.

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## ISRAEL IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

(Continued from page 167)

Many outside observers persist in proposing a grossly unrealistic and infeasible compromise which envisions the erection of some form of binational or federal state. Neither the Arabs nor the Israelis are willing even to consider such a proposal, just as the authorities in Pyongyang and Seoul would reject out

of hand any proposal for an all-Korean federal state which would incorporate the two existing regimes.

Two phenomena characterize Israeli politics today. First is the national obsession with physical survival. Widespread public opinion seems confident to the point of arrogance of Israeli military prowess and utterly contemptuous of the military and other capabilities of Israel's Arab enemies. This is best illustrated in a satirical joke being told in the political cafés of Tel Aviv. As the Israelis tell it, one Egyptian excitedly informed another, "The Russians have given us a billion dollars worth of the most modern new armaments." The second Egyptian replied, "Allah be praised. That's enough for at least two more defeats."

But in spite of their confidence, Israelis are nervous. Guerrilla raids and sabotage missions by the Arab *al-Fatah* organizations are increasing in number and effectiveness. These have evoked savage Israeli reprisals, including the blowing up of whole villages, demolition of selected Arab buildings in Jerusalem, punitive mass Israeli raids into Syria and Jordan and the mass destruction of Arab civil aircraft at the Beirut airport. Another aspect of survival stems from the Israeli occupation of vast new territories of land inhabited by 15 million bitterly hostile Arabs. There is no Israeli consensus as to what to do with the occupied land or its inhabitants and indeed these questions define the content of much of contemporary Israeli political life.

### FUTURE LEADERSHIP

A second crucial public issue is Israel's future political leadership. The country's political parties are still effectively controlled by East European Jews who are now in their seventies. What is at issue is not simply the advanced age of these leaders but their entire political style—socialist, paternalistic and intensely ideological—which permeates every aspect of Israeli public life. It seems clear that Israeli politics are long overdue for a top-to-bottom housecleaning. Public life is monopolized by old men who are highly skilled in the old-fashioned East European ways of patronage, barter and authority within an op-

pressive framework of endless disputation and hairsplitting over doctrinal points. But these same men are far less cognizant of the requirements of today's politics in Israel, and they are mostly ignorant of the techniques required for the successful operation of a modern, efficient industrial state.

It remains debatable whether the forthcoming general election will provide any thoroughgoing shake-up of Israeli political life. The old politics are personified by the present Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, who is nearly 80 years of age. His principal opponent is General Moshe Dayan, the flamboyant conqueror of the Arab armies in the 1967 war, currently serving as Minister of Defense in the Eshkol Cabinet. Dayan is of the "new breed" of Israeli public officials in that he is specifically anti-ideological and does not pay even the normal lip-service to the twin Israeli shibboleths of Zionism and socialism.

Second, Dayan is a technocrat, that is to say, one who understands the relationship of the economy to society and who seeks to modernize and make efficient and productive each of these interrelated entities. At the same time, however, Dayan displays an impatience with political forms and processes. This has led some observers to question his general understanding of and fitness for high political office. Harsher critics have asserted that Dayan is both a semi-authoritarian and a patriot to the point of chauvinism.

Dayan's principal opponent for the post of Prime Minister to succeed Eshkol is Yigal Allon, who resembles Dayan in some important aspects, including a similar anti-ideological outlook and a belief that sentiment and habit should not stand in the way of modernization and efficiency. But on one major point Allon and Dayan are very far apart: the question of what to do—both in the short and long range—with the Arab territories which were overrun and occupied by Israel's army in 1967: the Jordanian West Bank, including the Old City of Jerusalem; the Syrian Golan Heights at the headwaters of the Jordan River; the Gaza Strip; and the vast former Egyptian territory of the Sinai Peninsula. A considerable segment of Israeli public opinion

holds the view that most of the occupied territories can and should be returned to Arab control but that certain strategic areas must be retained for defensive purposes. The so-called Allon plan generally embodies this viewpoint.

Typically, General Dayan's plan for the occupied territories and their Arab inhabitants is radical and drastic. At the end of 1968, Dayan outlined a new program to the *Knesset* which would convert Israel and the rest of former Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza) into a single economic community. Included was the creation of a single labor market, joint industrial enterprises and a unified system of transportation. At the time Dayan spoke, the Old City of Jerusalem had already been incorporated into Israeli Jerusalem, and Israeli agricultural settlements have since been established in the Syrian Golan Heights. Most of the 1.5 million Arabs in the occupied zones are concentrated in Jerusalem (80,000), the West Bank (700,000), and the Gaza Strip (350,000). The Sinai Peninsula is nearly uninhabited—the one populated area, El Arish, is almost totally deserted; and the Golan Heights lost its population of 75,000 Arabs when they retreated with the Syrian Army.

Dayan's policy in the occupied areas is to treat opposition and terrorism swiftly, brutally and relentlessly. This includes the bombing of homes of civilians who are merely suspected of housing and aiding Arab guerrilla units. Strikes, demonstrations and even political meetings are banned. Israeli-branded "trouble-makers," including many former Arab public officials and community leaders, are summarily expelled to neighboring Jordan. In the short range, the results of Dayan's policy have been impressive. The occupied territories have been subdued and their control by Israel, although very expensive and time-consuming, has been effective.

Over the longer range, however, the outlook is far less promising. The demolition of civilian houses is brutally excessive and probably works to defeat its intended purpose. The banning of any political organizations precludes the establishment of any legitimate Arab Palestine movement which might even-

tually work cooperatively with Israel. Israel's unwillingness to permit the return of Arab refugees only further embitters the Arab world and creates a large manpower pool for terrorist organizations. The integration of the Palestinian economy will probably have the effect of making the occupation permanent. And, finally, the unilateral Israeli annexation of Old Jerusalem probably kills any future chance of serious Arab-Israeli negotiations.

The outlook is for more killing and for a great deal more suffering. The "hundred years' war" is on with a vengeance. In an area saturated with tragedy, one of the saddest results of this endless state of war is that the war itself is made to substitute for a beneficial and needed social revolution in the Arab countries. And, paradoxically, in Israel also, the war has drastically slowed down, even stifled, genuine social progress. On both sides, society is being thoroughly and rapidly shaped to conform to the limitless demands of militarism. Finally, the most ominous sign of all is that the leadership both in Israel and in the Arab world is tightly bound to policies which by definition cannot hope to provide a way out of this tragic morass.

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## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

*(Continued from page 168)*

Five million Americans have been trained for jobs in new Federal programs.

And I think it's most important that we all realize tonight that this nation is close to full employment, with less unemployment than we've had at any time in almost 20 years. And that's not in theory, that's in fact.

Tonight the unemployment rate is down to 3.3 per cent. The number of jobs has grown more than 8.5 million in the last five years.

• • •

We must increase our support for the Model Cities program where blueprints of change are already being prepared in more than 150 American cities.

To achieve the goals of the Housing Act of 1968 that you've just passed, we should begin this year more than 500,000 homes for needy families in the coming fiscal year, and

funds are provided in the new budget to do just this.

And this is almost 10 times—10 times—the average rate of the past 10 years. Our cities and our towns are being pressed for funds to meet the needs of their growing populations. So I believe an urban development bank should be created by the Congress. This bank should obtain resources through the issuance of taxable bonds, and it could then lend these resources at reduced rates to the communities throughout the land for schools and hospitals and parks and other public facilities.

Since we enacted the Social Security Act back in 1935, Congress has recognized the necessity to make more adequate provision for aged persons, maternal and child welfare and public health. And that is the words of the Congress.

More adequate, and the time has come, I think, to make it more adequate, and I believe we should increase Social Security benefits, and I am so recommending it now, suggesting that there should be an over-all increase in benefits of at least 13 per cent, and those who receive only the minimum—\$55—should get \$80 a month.

Our nation, too, is rightfully proud of our medical advances. But we should remember that our country ranks 15th among the nations of the world in its infant mortality rate. I think we should assure decent medical care for every expectant mother and for their children during the first year of their life in the United States of America.

• • •

The antipoverty program has had many achievements. It also has some failures. But we must not cripple it after only three years of trying to solve the human problems that have been with us and have been building up among us for generations.

I believe the Congress this year will want to improve the administration of the poverty program by reorganizing portions of it and transferring them to other agencies. I believe though it will want to continue until we have broken the back of poverty with the efforts we're now making throughout this land.

I believe—and I hope the next Administration—I believe they believe—that the key to success in this effort is jobs, is work for people who want to work. In the budget for fiscal 1970 I shall recommend a total of \$3.5-billion for our job training program, and that's five times as much as we spent in 1964 trying to prepare Americans where they can work to earn their own living.

The nation's commitments in the field of civil rights began with the Declaration of Independence. They were extended by the 13th and 14th and 15th Amendments, and they have been powerfully strengthened by the enactment of three far-reaching civil rights laws within the past five years that this Congress in its wisdom passed.

• • •

Frankly, as I leave the office of the Presidency, one of my greatest disappointments is our failure to secure passage of a licensing and registration act for firearms. I think if we had passed that act it would have reduced the incidence of crime, and I believe that Congress should adopt such a law, and I hope that it will at a not too distant date.

• • •

In 1967, I recommended to the Congress a fair and impartial random selection system for the draft. I submit it again tonight for your most respectful consideration. And I know that all of us recognize that most of the things we do to meet all of these commitments I talked about will cost money, and if we maintain the strong rate of growth that we've had in this country for the past eight years, I think we shall generate the resources that we need to meet these commitments.

We have already been able to increase our support for major social programs, although we've heard a lot about not being able to do anything on the homefront because of Vietnam. But we have been able in the last five years to increase our commitments for such things as health and education from \$30 billion in 1964 to \$68 billion in the coming fiscal year.

That's more than double. And that's more than it's ever been increased in the 188 years of this Republic, notwithstanding Vietnam.

• • •

Greater revenues and the reduced Federal spending required by Congress last year have changed the budgetary picture dramatically since last January, when we made our estimates.

At that time you'll remember that we estimated we'd have a deficit of \$8 billion. Well, I'm glad to report to you tonight that in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, this June, we are going to have not a deficit; but we're going to have a \$2.4-billion surplus.

You will receive the budget tomorrow—it's the budget for the next fiscal year that begins next July 1—that you will want to examine very carefully in the days ahead. It will provide a \$3.4-billion surplus.

This budget anticipates the extension of the surtax that Congress enacted last year. I have communicated with President-elect Nixon in connection with this policy and continuing the surtax for the time being. I want to tell you that both of us want to see it removed just as soon as circumstances will permit. But the President-elect has told me that he has concluded that until his Administration and this Congress can examine the appropriation bills and each item in the budget, and can ascertain that the facts justify permitting the surtax to expire or to reduce, he, Mr. Nixon, will support my recommendation that the surtax be continued.

Americans, I believe, are united in the hope that the Paris talks will bring an early peace to Vietnam. And if our hopes for an early settlement of the war are realized, then our military expenditures can be reduced and very substantial savings can be made to be used for other desirable purposes as the Congress may determine.

• • •

And now it's time to leave. I hope it may be said a hundred years from now that by working together we helped to make our country more just—more just for all of its people as well as to insure and guarantee the blessings of liberty for all of our posterity. That's what I hope. But I believe that at least it will be said that we tried.

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# The Month In Review

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*A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of January, 1969, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon)

Jan. 23—According to informed sources, the 8 East European members of Comecon end a 3-day meeting in East Berlin today.

Jan. 30—In East Berlin, Communist sources report that the 22d meeting of Comecon has ended in a deadlock over major issues.

### European Economic Community (Common Market)

Jan. 13—The finance ministers and central bank governors from the 6 Common Market member states meet in West Germany.

Jan. 28—At a meeting of the Council of Ministers, French Foreign Minister Michel Debré declares that his country wants the E.E.C. to adopt a more protectionist policy for agriculture.

### General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt)

Jan. 1—Customs duties on thousands of products are reduced by the U.S. and other industrial countries as a result of the Kennedy round of tariff-cutting negotiations concluded in 1967. The reduction is the second round of the tariff cuts.

### International Monetary Crisis

Jan. 8—On the gold markets in London and Zurich, the price of gold climbs to \$42.45 an ounce, the highest level in 8 months.

Jan. 22—U.S. Secretary of the Treasury David Kennedy affirms support for maintaining the price of gold at the official rate of \$35 an ounce.

### Middle East Crisis

(See also *France; Intl, U.N.*)

Jan. 1—Israelis report that last night the

border town of Kiryat Shmona was shelled by Lebanese guns.

It is reported that late last night the Lebanese Parliament approved a Cabinet decision warning Israel that Lebanon will act to defend herself against future attacks.

Jan. 2—A Lebanese military communiqué reports that Israeli forces fired on Lebanese military posts in a 2½ hour frontier battle.

Jan. 3—U.N. Secretary General U Thant supports a Soviet plan for a Big Four meeting—the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Britain and France—to work out a Middle East settlement.

Jan. 4—The Jordanian government announces that 2 men, convicted of spying for Israel, have been hanged.

Jan. 5—It is reported that Israeli and Lebanese officials have met near their border to try to reduce border tensions.

Jan. 7—The French government confirms that it banned deliveries of military equipment and spare parts to Israel.

Jan. 9—*The New York Times* reports that, according to Western and Israeli sources, the Soviet plan of December 30, 1968, for a Middle East peace is based on a Four Power settlement, not an Israeli-Arab negotiated accord. The Soviet plan calls for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all lands occupied after the June, 1967, war without a prior or concurrent peace treaty between Israel and the Arab states.

During 2 hours of shelling between Israeli and Jordanian forces, the Damiya Bridge linking the Jordanian East Bank with the Israeli-occupied West Bank is blown up.

Jan. 27—At dawn, 14 persons including 9 Jews are hanged by the Iraqi government, after their conviction on charges of spying for Israel.

U.N. Secretary General U Thant expresses his fear that the executions in Iraq



may impair chances for a Middle East settlement.

Gunnar V. Jarring, U.N. special representative to the Middle East, arrives in N. Y. for talks with Thant.

Jan. 28—U Thant, at a news conference, asserts that "big power cooperation is essential" if the U.N. is to be able to help restore peace in the Middle East.

U.S. State Department officials declare that the U.S. has asked Israel not to retaliate for the execution of 9 Iraqi Jews.

Jan. 29—A letter from the U.S. government is delivered to the President of the U.N. Security Council; the mass executions in Iraq are condemned.

### **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**

Jan. 16—Following a meeting of NATO's Defense Planning Committee, a communiqué is issued announcing that "the concept of an allied naval force" has been approved.

### **United Nations**

(See also *Middle East Crisis*)

Jan. 18—U.N. Secretary General U Thant voices support for the French proposal of Jan. 17 to have the U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain and France discuss a Middle East settlement if the talks remain within the framework of the U.N.

Jan. 22—Raúl Prebisch, Secretary General of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, cautions that violent change may occur in developing countries unless modern technology is controlled for the common good.

### **War in Vietnam**

Jan. 6—U.S. President-elect Richard Nixon appoints Henry Cabot Lodge, twice Ambassador to South Vietnam, to head the U.S. delegation at the Paris peace talks.

Jan. 11—The Vietcong stages mortar attacks on at least 24 cities, towns and bases in South Vietnam.

Jan. 12—U.S. and North Vietnamese delegates in Paris meet for the first time in

10 days to try to break the deadlock over the seating arrangements and the shape of the conference table.

Jan. 13—In the Mekong Delta 75 miles southwest of Saigon, the Cantho Air Base is the site of an enemy commando attack.

Jan. 16—Spokesman for the U.S. delegation to the Paris peace talks William J. Jordan announces that the first of expanded talks between North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front on one side and the U.S. and South Vietnam on the other will be held on January 18. Delegates will sit at a round table with 2 rectangular secretarial tables on opposite sides 18 inches from the circular table. The arrangement allows the U.S. to call the talks 2-sided, while the enemy side may refer to them as 4-sided.

Jan. 18—In a statement issued today, South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu announces that South Vietnam and the U.S. will "draft a program" for the withdrawal of some U.S. troops from South Vietnam, probably not more than 50,000 men.

In Paris, the U.S., South Vietnam, North Vietnam and the N.L.F. confer for 5 hours and 10 minutes and agree on the procedure to govern the talks on ending the war in Vietnam. Each of the 4 parties will be represented by 15 delegates.

Jan. 20—Henry Cabot Lodge arrives in Paris to take over as head of the U.S. delegation to the Paris peace talks, replacing W. Averell Harriman.

Jan. 24—South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky returns to Paris from Saigon.

Jan. 25—In the first plenary session of the Paris peace talks, U.S. representative Lodge urges that a real demilitarized zone (DMZ) be reestablished between North and South Vietnam.

Jan. 27—In Paris, Ky tells newsmen that he would be willing to hold "private talks with the other side" at a future time.

Jan. 28—The Vietcong delegation declares that the U.S. must accept North Vietnamese and Vietcong political demands.

It rejects U.S. proposals for restoring the DMZ, for the withdrawal of outside forces from South Vietnam, and for prisoner exchanges.

Jan. 30—At the second plenary meeting of the expanded peace talks, the N.L.F. and the North Vietnamese delegations declare that a reduction in the war effort must go hand in hand with a political settlement. The 2 enemy delegations reject a restoration of the DMZ as an initial step towards peace.

## ARGENTINA

Jan. 16—Argentina publishes a law aimed at preventing United States penetration of local banking. Argentines are worried by recent investments in several banks by the First National City Bank of New York and by the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (U.S.).

## BOLIVIA

Jan. 10—The police report that a terrorist bomb thrown last night from a passing car at the residence of the United States Ambassador caused no injuries.

Jan. 18—The government establishes a state of siege following its discovery of a plot to overthrow President René Barrientos Ortuño. The Interior Ministry states it has arrested a number of the alleged plotters.

Jan. 22—Interior Minister Captain David Fernandes resigns in protest against a presidential order releasing 6 men recently arrested and charged with subversion.

## BRAZIL

Jan. 2—President Artur da Costa e Silva promulgates 19 changes in the constitution and 8 new laws aimed at increasing the regime's control over government spending and reducing distortions in the economy. The most important measure reduces the portion of the federal budget for states and municipalities from 20 to 12 per cent.

Jan. 7—Political and military police enter the office of the Rio newspaper *Correio da Manhã* and prevent distribution of today's edition.

Jan. 15—Brazil's Cabinet meets with President Costa e Silva for the first time since he seized dictatorial powers on December 13.

Jan. 16—The military regime of President Costa e Silva removes 3 Supreme Court justices and 37 federal congressmen from office. At the same time it removes the political rights of Mrs. Niomar Moniz Sodre Bittencourt, publisher of the newspaper *Correio da Manhã*, denying her the right to make public political statements for 10 years.

Jan. 18—The President of Brazil's Supreme Court, Antônio Gonçalves de Oliveira, resigns to protest the dismissal of 3 Supreme Court justices by the military government.

Jan. 22—Justice Luis Gallotti agrees to serve as President of the Supreme Court, replacing Gonçalves de Oliveira.

## CHILE

Jan. 8—A 48-hour strike by state employees starts. Police halt without violence 1,500 demonstrators in a march on the National Palace, but use tear gas on strikers attacking city buses.

Jan. 17—President Eduardo Frei Montalva signs a bill calling for reform of Chile's 44-year-old constitution. In an earlier radio and television address, he has described the reform as indispensable for "the subsistence of our democratic regime." The proposed reform would permit him to dismiss Congress and call for national elections if he failed to get Congress to pass fundamentally important bills.

## CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Jan. 15—Reports from Hong Kong indicate that millions of Chinese are migrating from the cities into the countryside; the government is supposedly removing potential political activists from urban centers.

Jan. 19—Observers in Hong Kong report many signs that China is planning to expand her contacts with the outside world. Tailors are reportedly making Western style suits for Foreign Office personnel.

## COLOMBIA

Jan. 24—A week-long transport strike ends in Bogotá. Labor unrest in Colombia in the last 2 weeks has claimed 6 lives; more than 20 persons have been injured and some 700 arrests have been made.

## CONGO, REPUBLIC OF (Brazzaville)

Jan. 1—A government reshuffle is announced. Major Marien Ngouabi becomes head of the ruling National Council of the Revolution, replacing Major Alfred Raoul. Raoul retains the office of Premier.

## CUBA

Jan. 2—Premier Fidel Castro commits Cuba to a long-range agricultural development plan and, by implication, postpones the country's industrialization. He speaks at a mass rally in Havana commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Cuban revolution.

Jan. 8—A band of Cuban refugees arrives in Miami after shooting their way past Cuban Army guards and into the United States base at Guantánamo. Eighty-one Cubans succeeded in entering Guantánamo, while 30 more were captured and 12 to 15 were killed in the largest group escape from Castro's Cuba.

Jan. 18—It is reported that the government has ordered the 2 million members of the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution to intensify their surveillance over the remaining 6 million Cubans. On January 12, the Committee's national directorate issued a statement saying "Improved revolutionary vigilance will be our prime task in 1969." This week, the Committee began a 45-day all-out effort to increase its activities.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Jan. 1—Oldrich Cernik is named Premier of the newly-created federal government by President Ludvik Svoboda. Five of the 7 federal ministers retain their posts.

Jan. 2—Stefan Sadovsky is named Premier of the new Slovak Republic. Under the new constitution, Czech and Slovak republics

have internal autonomy. Stanislav Razl is Premier of the Czech republic.

Jan. 4—The Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist party warns of serious consequences unless protests and agitation for liberal reforms are stopped.

Jan. 5—Josef Smrkovsky asks the nation to refrain from striking if he is demoted from his position as Chairman of the National Assembly. He is to be replaced by a Slovak.

Jan. 7—The Presidium announces that Smrkovsky will keep his membership on the Executive Committee of the Presidium and that he will receive a new appointment.

Jan. 8—Additional controls are placed on radio and television broadcasts and on newspapers by the government to stem outspoken criticism of the ending of liberalization.

Jan. 11—The Soviet Union announces it will hold troop maneuvers in Czechoslovakia.

Jan. 14—Imposition of strict press curbs is delayed after editors pledge to exercise a degree of self-censorship.

Jan. 15—About 2,000 students and workers meet in Prague to condemn Soviet occupation; they demand an end to the "humiliating consequences" of the August 20, 1968, invasion.

Jan. 16—Jan Palach, a 21-year-old student, sets himself afire in Prague in a gesture of resistance to the Soviet-led repression of liberalization.

Jan. 19—Palach dies of his burns. Expressions of sympathy are sent to his parents by Cernik and Svoboda and party leader Alexander Dubcek.

Jan. 20—A second young Czechoslovak sets himself afire in Prague. No motive is made public.

Jan. 21—On the 5-month anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, Premier Cernik tells a trade union congress that reforms cannot be hastened and the leadership cannot hasten liberalization in the present complicated situation.

Jan. 25—A silent crowd of half a million Czechoslovak citizens attend the funeral of Jan Palach.

Jan. 26—Prague police use tear gas to disperse students and workers demonstrating in honor of Jan Palach.

Jan. 30—In response to Soviet pressure, the government removes 120 journalists who have been most outspoken in their support of liberalization.

### DENMARK

Jan. 3—Following the lead of Great Britain, Nigeria and Ireland, Denmark ratifies the treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

### EL SALVADOR

Jan. 1—It is reported that President Fidel Sanchez Fernandez yesterday vetoed a bill which would have forced foreigners owning enterprises worth \$40,000 or more to turn them over to Salvadorians or close them by today.

### FRANCE

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis, U.N.*)

Jan. 2—New taxes are imposed in an effort to halt inflation. Prices of consumer goods rise.

Jan. 14—The government pledges to aid Lebanon in the event of an attack by Israel.

Jan. 18—Three military officers are named to aid Lebanon in a study of her defense problems, in the wake of the retaliatory raid by Israeli forces.

Former Premier Georges Pompidou announces he will seek the presidency on the retirement of President Charles de Gaulle.

Jan. 22—De Gaulle states that he will complete his term which runs until December, 1972.

### GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Jan. 10—Formal talks between West Germany and the Soviet Union begin again. They were broken off following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968.

Jan. 15—Reports reach West Germany that at least 20 East Germans who criticized the invasion of Czechoslovakia last August are given long prison terms.

Jan. 20—The government announces that

West German gold and currency reserves declined by \$386 million in the week ending January 15.

### GUYANA

Jan. 3—It is reported that at least 5 persons were killed yesterday when a rebel group seized the village of Lethem on the Brazilian border. The government reports its forces have retaken the village and describes the rebel group as consisting mainly of ranchers, miners and a few United States nationals.

Jan. 4—Government troops fly to the southern region of Guyana on the border of Brazil to crush an armed revolt allegedly led by cattle ranchers.

Jan. 5—A government spokesman says that Guyanese troops have crushed the rebellion on the border of Guyana and Brazil. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham accuses Venezuela of having organized the revolt in the cattle-ranching area along the border.

Jan. 6—The minority United Force party expels Mrs. Valerie Hart from its membership because of her "public identification with the rebellion and plot by a foreign power." Mrs. Hart was a candidate in the December 16 general elections. She is now in Caracas, Venezuela.

Jan. 12—The new Working Peoples' Vanguard party makes public a plan for transforming Guyana into a socialist state. The party is headed by Brindley H. Benn, formerly a chief aide of Cheddi B. Jagan, leader of the opposition People's Progressive party. Benn, who supports the Chinese Communist line of revolution, broke with Jagan just before the general elections last December.

Jan. 15—The government bans missionaries, U.S. Peace Corps personnel and Canadian and British volunteers from the Rupununi district near the Brazilian border, the scene of the recent rebellion.

Jan. 24—Eighteen of 28 persons accused of murder in the recent abortive rebellion in southern Guyana are released after the prosecution withdraws charges against them.

## INDONESIA

Jan. 4—The government of President Suharto proposes a 5-year plan that stresses the production of food and clothing. \$2.5 billion dollars will be devoted to agriculture (one-third), textile production facilities, industrial capacity and vocational training. Defense expenditures will be limited to 2.6 per cent of the budget.

## ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis; France*)

Jan. 15—A jet engine plant is opened by Premier Levi Eshkol. The factory will manufacture engines formerly imported from France but now embargoed.

## ITALY

Jan. 17—Mariano Rumor, Premier of the coalition Cabinet, resigns as head of the Christian Democratic party to give more time to his government post.

Jan. 19—The Christian Democratic party elects a new secretary, Flaminio Piccoli.

## LEBANON

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Jan. 7—Premier Abdullah Yaffi submits his resignation to President Charles Helou in the wake of a Cabinet crisis caused by the Israeli attack on the Beirut International Airport.

Jan. 16—A 9-day Cabinet crisis is ended as Rashid Karami, the new Premier, completes appointments to a 16-member coalition Cabinet.

## MEXICO

Jan. 3—The National Statistics Administration reports that births in Mexico passed the 2-million mark in 1968. The rate of births was 43.04 per one thousand inhabitants, putting the country among the 5 nations in the world having the highest birth rates.

## NIGERIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 13—The government of Nigeria bars any

consideration of a cease-fire with Biafra.

Jan. 19—Reports from relief workers in Biafra indicate that starvation and disease are still on the rise.

The leaders of Biafra have appealed to 3 Scandinavian countries to arrange a cease-fire agreement with the federal government in Nigeria. The Biafrans promise prompt peace negotiations.

## PAKISTAN

Jan. 6—Five opposition parties refuse to participate in the next elections unless "minimum conditions of democracy" are granted by the government.

Jan. 17—A protest by anti-government demonstrators demanding more democracy is dispersed by police using clubs and tear gas.

Jan. 28—Continuation of violent clashes between police and demonstrators in East and West Pakistan results in the imposition of martial law in many cities. The death toll in the clashes rises to 21.

## PANAMA

Jan. 3—An official of the military junta says 3 members of former President Marco A. Robles' administration and an ex-legislator who held highway construction contracts have been arrested.

Jan. 6—The military junta imposes censorship on the newspaper *El Mundo* and orders the manager of the Panama American newspaper chain, Rodrigo Moreno, replaced immediately.

Jan. 10—The military junta replaces 5 civilian Cabinet ministers who resigned yesterday in a protest against government procedures.

Jan. 21—The military junta says it has issued an arrest order for the wife of former President Robles for alleged misuse of public funds. Mrs. Robles resides with her husband in Coral Gables, Florida.

Jan. 24—Henry G. Ford, President of the Panama Chamber of Commerce, calls for a Latino dollar patterned after the Euro-dollar, to afford Latin America a new international money market. He makes his proposal in an address to the American



Management Association meeting in N.Y.

## **PERU**

- Jan. 3—The revolutionary government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado orders 75 per cent of the capital of all commercial banks to be placed in Peruvian banks. Banks are given one year to make the adjustment. A decree requires new banks in Peru to be 100 per cent Peruvian owned.
- Jan. 4—The Supreme Court upholds the expropriation of the oil installations of the International Petroleum Corporation, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, by the government of General Velasco Alvarado on October 9, 1968.
- Jan. 14—The government officially expropriates 18 cattle ranches in central Peru from the Cerro de Pasco Company, a unit of the Cerro Corporation, a large United States copper producer. The ranches were expropriated soon after the military coup October 3, 1968. The government will pay for acreage in government bonds, but will pay \$500,000 in cash for installations and \$2.5 million in cash for cattle.

## **PHILIPPINES**

- Jan. 2—Newly-appointed Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo voices a nationalistic approach to Philippine-U.S. relations in his first statement. Romulo says it may be necessary to alter agreements with the U.S. shortening the time the U.S. can use military bases in the islands.

## **SPAIN**

- Jan. 14—Petitions demanding the end of police abuse of political prisoners are signed by some 1,300 intellectuals.
- Jan. 17—The College of Lawyers of Madrid, the nation's leading bar association, votes unanimously for better treatment of political prisoners.
- Jan. 21—Some 2,000 students march in protest over the death of a student who died last night during police questioning.
- Jan. 24—Five articles of the Constitution are suspended and a state of siege is enforced as a result of continuing disorders.

- Jan. 25—Police begin arresting students and workers under the new state of siege. Unofficial estimates place the arrests in the hundreds.

- Jan. 31—The government announces that 18 faculty members of the University of Madrid have been sent to remote villages in the provinces. The men, who are economists, editors and lawyers, were active in recent protests against the government's treatment of political prisoners.

## **U.S.S.R.**

*(See also Intl, Middle East)*

- Jan. 5—A Soviet journal proposes a Four-Power conference of Britain, France, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to guarantee a Middle East peace settlement.
- Jan. 7—A spokesman for the Foreign Affairs Ministry terms the planned NATO maneuvers on the Czechoslovak border a "provocation."
- Jan. 20—Members of the Foreign Ministry announce they are ready to start a serious exchange of views with the U.S. on curbing the arms race. Previous progress toward initiating the talks was halted by the U.S. following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968.

## **UNITED KINGDOM, THE British Territories**

### ***Bahamas, The***

- Jan. 11—Prime Minister Lynden O. Pin-dling reshuffles his Cabinet in what he describes as an attempt to streamline his administration. He gives up the Ministry of Tourism and Development which he has held since January, 1967. Former Communications Minister Arthur Foulkes will assume the Tourism post; the new Development Minister is Jeffrey Thompson, former Internal Affairs Minister.

## **Great Britain**

- Jan. 4—In Londonderry, Northern Ireland, some Protestant extremists attack a group of Catholic students marching to protest the denial of civil rights to the Roman Catholic minority.

Jan. 11—Some 5,000 Catholic marchers clash with police as the demonstrators demand greater democracy for non-Protestants.

## UNITED STATES

### Civil Rights

(See *Race Relations*)

### Economy

(See also *Intl, Monetary Crisis*)

Jan. 6—The Treasury reports that the national debt reached a 1968 year-end-total of \$361.2 billion, an increase of 4 per cent.

Jan. 7—For the third time in 6 weeks, major banks raise the prime rate—the basic interest charge on loans to corporations with the highest credit ratings—to a record 7 per cent.

Jan. 9—The Department of Labor reports the lowest unemployment rate in 15 years; the rate of unemployment in December, 1968, held at the 15-year low reached in November—3.3 per cent of the labor force.

Jan. 14—The Department of Commerce reports a rise of 9 per cent in the Gross National Product for 1968 as a whole; the fourth quarter figures indicate that the business boom may be slowing, according to some observers.

Jan. 24—Incoming Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development George Romney announces a rise in the interest rate ceiling on government-backed mortgages to 7.5 per cent from 6.75 per cent.

Jan. 26—In a letter to all department heads made public today, Budget Director Robert P. Mayo asks them to review and reduce their budget requests.

Jan. 29—The Labor Department reports that the Consumer Price Index rose .2 of 1 per cent in December, 1968, indicating a price increase of 4.7 per cent in 1968—the largest annual consumer price increase since the Korean War year of 1951.

The Department of Commerce reports that the surplus of exports over imports declined to \$726 million in 1968, the lowest surplus since 1937; exports grew but imports also rose. The balance of payments

is reported to have shown a small surplus, the first since 1957.

The Treasury announces that it will have to pay 6.42 per cent interest to sell a 15-month note issue—the highest interest rate on a federal security since 1865.

### Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis, War in Vietnam; U.S., Govt.*)

Jan. 6—U.S. sources in Paris report that the U.S. has decided to bill France for the cost of U.S. installations vacated in 1967 after NATO forces were asked to leave France by French President Charles de Gaulle. The bill is likely to total more than \$300 million.

Jan. 17—Replying to a Soviet proposal made Dec. 30 on a settlement of the Middle East crisis, the U.S. suggests that the settlement be pursued on 2 levels, but urges that “primary efforts to achieve just and lasting peace” should rest with the U.N.

Jan. 22—The State Department reveals that the U.S.S.R. has accepted a U.S. invitation to participate in an international conference in Washington in February on communications satellites.

Jan. 24—President Richard Nixon asks his administration to prepare a thorough study of U.S. relief efforts for the civilian victims of the 19-month-old Nigerian civil war.

Jan. 27—In his first news conference as President, Richard Nixon suggests that arms control discussions with the U.S.S.R. should be held “in a way . . . that will promote . . . progress on outstanding political problems at the same time. . . .”

### Government

Jan. 2—Voting in Democratic caucus, Democrats endorse 77-year-old Congressman John W. McCormack (D.) of Massachusetts for his fifth term as Speaker of the House of Representatives, defeating 46-year-old Morris Udall (D., Arizona). Carl Albert (D., Okla.) is unanimously re-endorsed as majority leader. In Republican caucus, Republicans reendorse Gerald Ford of Michigan as House minority leader

and Leslie Arends as House minority whip.  
Jan. 3—The 91st Congress convenes. In the House, the Democrats retain control, 243 to 192; in the Senate, Democrats hold 57 seats, Republicans, 43.

Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy defeats Louisiana Senator Russell Long for the post of Democratic whip in the Senate, after secret balloting in the Senate Democratic caucus confirms him.

The House of Representatives votes 251 to 160 to seat Democratic Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, who represents the Negro area of Harlem in New York City. He is deprived of 22 years of seniority and fined \$25,000 for alleged misuse of government funds while he was Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee. Powell was deprived of his seat March 1, 1967.

Jan. 4—President-elect Richard Nixon names the Attorney General of Massachusetts, Elliot Richardson, as Under Secretary of State. Ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson is named Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Richard F. Pedersen is named Counselor to the State Department. Pedersen is now Deputy U.S. Representative in the U.N. Security Council.

Nixon says he wants U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker to remain in his post "for a period of time."

Jan. 6—M.I.T. Professor Robert C. Seamans, Jr., is named Secretary of the Air Force; former Governor of Rhode Island John H. Chafee is named Secretary of the Navy; Stanley R. Resor is to continue as Secretary of the Army.

Jan. 7—Vice President-elect Spiro Agnew resigns as Governor of Maryland.

Jan. 9—Senator Eugene McCarthy (D., Minn.) gives up his Senate Foreign Relations Committee seat to Wyoming Senator Gale McGhee (D.), clearing the way for the cut in the size of the committee requested by committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas.

Secretary of State-designate William P. Rogers announces that Harlan Cleveland

will remain as U.S. Ambassador to NATO until May 1.

It is reported in Washington that Charles E. Walker, executive vice president of the American Bankers Association, is to be Under Secretary of the Treasury.

Jan. 11—William Rogers names yachtsman Emil Mosbacher, Jr., as Chief of Protocol of the State Department, succeeding Tyler Abell.

Jan. 13—It is reported in Washington that Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William P. Bundy will remain at his post temporarily.

Jan. 14—President Lyndon B. Johnson delivers his farewell State of the Union message to Congress.

Jan. 15—President Johnson sends Congress a \$195.3 billion budget for fiscal 1970, estimating a surplus of \$3.4 billion if the 10 per cent surtax is retained, and if receipts continue to grow in an expanding economy.

Jan. 17—The Justice Department files suit against I.B.M. (the International Business Machines Corporation), charging that I.B.M. is monopolizing the general purpose digital computer market.

Jan. 18—President Johnson signs a bill doubling the President's salary to \$200,000 a year; the increase—the first since 1949—will take effect with the inauguration of Richard Nixon.

Jan. 20—Richard Milhous Nixon is inaugurated as the 37th President of the United States. Former Maryland Governor Spiro T. Agnew is sworn in as Vice President.

The Senate confirms 11 members of the Nixon Cabinet; confirmation of Alaskan Governor Walter J. Hickel as Secretary of the Interior is delayed.

By proclamation, President Johnson adds 384,500 acres to the national parkland system acting on his authority under the Antiquities Act of 1906. He withholds action on 7.5 million acres proposed for parkland by Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall. This is his last official act before the Nixon inauguration.

Jan. 22—Eleven of the 12 members of the Nixon cabinet are sworn in.

Jan. 23—President Nixon names Columbia University Professor Arthur F. Burns as Counselor to the President. Burns was Chairman of the Eisenhower Administration's Council of Economic Advisers. The newly-created post carries Cabinet rank.

The President withdraws the names of all nominees for federal positions named by Lyndon Johnson who have not yet been confirmed by the Senate. Similar action was taken by President John F. Kennedy when he took office.

The Senate confirms Alaska's Governor Hickel as Secretary of the Interior.

It is reported from Washington that Fresno, California's Mayor Floyd H. Hyde has been named to succeed Ralph Taylor in the Department of Housing and Urban Development as Assistant Secretary for Model Cities and Intergovernmental Relations.

Jan. 24—President Nixon asks the Civil Aeronautics Board to send him its recommendations on the allocation of trans-Pacific routes for the major airlines; he rescinds at least temporarily the awards for the trans-Pacific air routes made by former President Johnson.

Vice President Spiro Agnew announces that the U.S. government has agreed to sell the Brooklyn Navy Yard to New York City for \$22.5 million or less. The federal government previously rejected the city's offer of some \$23.5 million. The property will be developed by New York City as an industrial site.

Jan. 25—Secretary of Housing and Urban Development George Romney announces 5 major appointments, including 2 Negroes, for high-level posts in his department.

Jan. 28—For the ninth time since 1953, the liberal-moderate group in the Senate fails to modify Rule 22 which requires a two-thirds vote to cut off debate in the Senate. Today's vote fails to end a 3-week debate on the rules change.

Jan. 29—The White House announces the President's choice of Gerard C. Smith as director of the Arms Control and Disarma-

ment Agency, succeeding William C. Foster. Smith was senior adviser on atomic and disarmament policies to President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.

## Labor

Jan. 10—A nation-wide strike by the Wire Service Guild is called against the Associated Press news service. The Guild represents some 1,300 reporters, deskmen, photographers, cartoonists, messengers and clerks.

Jan. 13—Approximately 1,000 employees of the Union-Pure Oil Company accept a company offer for wage increases and fringe benefits and begin to return to work in California. The continuing oil strike of 50,000 workers is in its ninth day.

President Johnson appoints a presidential emergency board to look into the factors triggering a railroad strike against most of the nation's railroads by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. The strike against 60 railroads is automatically postponed 60 days.

Jan. 18—The strike against the Associated Press ends after agreement is reached on wage increases and other benefits.

Jan. 25—The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union reaches a tentative agreement with the Gulf Oil Corporation; this is the largest single advance in the 3-week-old oil strike.

Jan. 26—The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union votes to accept a new contract with Sinclair Oil Corporation; some 5,700 oil refinery workers begin to return to work after wage increases and other benefits are granted.

Philadelphia longshore union leaders refuse to accept intervention by the International Longshoremen's Association; the President of the I.L.A., Thomas W. Gleason, asked the national union's general organizer to try to negotiate differences with the Philadelphia local in an effort to end the 37-day-old waterfront strike tying up the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts.

## Military

- Jan. 14—The nuclear-powered U.S. aircraft carrier *Enterprise* suffers fire and explosion in an accident.
- Jan. 20—Testifying at the opening of a Naval Court of Inquiry into the North Korean seizure of his ship, the *Pueblo*, in January, 1968, Commander Lloyd Bucher charges that the Navy refused to install a "destruct system" for the secret electronic equipment on the espionage vessel, despite the fact that he requested such a system "two, perhaps three times."
- Jan. 21—The death toll in the accident on the *Enterprise* reaches 27; some 100 were injured.
- Jan. 31—The Navy announces that scuttling devices and 20-mm. cannon are being added to intelligence ships of the *Pueblo* class, in the hope of preventing their capture in the future.

## Politics

- Jan. 2—The Federal Communications Commission reports that preliminary statistics reveal that the Republicans spent \$5 million for television campaigning during the presidential election campaign; the Democrats spent \$3 million.
- Jan. 7—The chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Lawrence F. O'Brien, resigns.
- Jan. 14—The Democratic National Committee names Oklahoma Senator Fred R. Harris to succeed O'Brien.

## Race Relations

- Jan. 11—Revision of Virginia's state constitution, which dates from 1776, is urged by an 11-man commission. Among the proposed deletions is a section declaring that "white and colored children shall not be taught in the same school."
- Jan. 14—Roy Wilkins, executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, says that black students' demands for all-black studies departments on college campuses are "another version of segregation and Jim Crow."

Opposing separatism, Wilkins indicates that the N.A.A.C.P. may challenge in the courts white colleges and universities that establish separate racial facilities.

- Jan. 16—A 9-member panel reports to New York's Mayor John Lindsay that "an appalling amount of prejudice—black and white—surfaced in and about the school [decentralization] controversy."

- Jan. 21—After 9 months of consultation, a special 8-member faculty panel at Harvard University makes public a 51-page report urging the establishment of a full degree-granting program in Afro-American studies at the university. The recommendations have been approved by Harvard's Committee on Educational Policy.

Roy M. Innis, the national director of CORE (Congress of Racial Equality), charges that Roy Wilkins is consistently opposing the "legitimate aspirations of black people."

- Jan. 23—Concluding a report on racial tensions in New York City, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith warns that "raw, undisguised anti-Semitism is at a crisis level in New York City schools where, unchecked by public authority, it has been building for more than two years."

- Jan. 29—Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Robert M. Finch announces that the administration will postpone for 60 days its withdrawal of federal funds from 5 Southern school districts which were scheduled to lose federal support because of their refusal to eliminate segregated school systems.

## Supreme Court

- Jan. 13—The Supreme Court affirms a lower court decision upholding the constitutionality of New York State's regulations that force welfare clients to repay benefits if they later inherit real estate or receive personal-injury awards or insurance benefits. Thirty-two other states have similar rules.

- Jan. 14—The Court rules 6 to 3 that 18 makers of corrugated boxes have acted in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act by



exchanging price information that tended to fix prices and stifle competition, despite little evidence that the exchange of information actually stabilized prices in the industry.

The Court rules unanimously that members of a railroad union in Alabama can ask for hearings in federal courts on their complaints of racial discrimination without following union procedural rules.

Jan. 20—The Court rules 8 to 1 that an Akron, Ohio, charter amendment is unconstitutional; it requires that before a repealed fair housing law can be re-enacted, a popular referendum must approve it. By singling out fair housing laws as the only laws subject to special referendum, the Court rules, Akron is denying Negro citizens equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.

The Court unanimously affirms a lower court ruling that U.S. Senator Charles E. Goodell (R., N.Y.) may serve in the place of the late Senator Robert Kennedy until December 1, 1970. The case is the first to interpret the meaning of the 17th Amendment providing that state governors may make only "temporary" appointments to fill a senatorial vacancy. Goodell will serve until Robert Kennedy's term would have expired.

Jan. 27—The Supreme Court rules 5 to 3 that before a magistrate may issue a warrant to search for evidence of gambling, there must be some detailed description of the suspect's activity and some evidence of the reliability of the source of the police information.

The Court rules 6 to 3 that the Securities and Exchange Commission has the authority to block a merger if the merging companies have made false statements to their shareholders in proxy statements.

## URUGUAY

Jan. 21—Striking government employees riot in downtown Montevideo. The police report one person killed and 32 injured.

Jan. 25—Uruguay accuses Argentina of landing troops on an island in the River Plate.

## VENEZUELA

Jan. 9—Venezuela returns a Guyanese note accusing her of involvement in an abortive rebellion last week by ranchers in the Rupununi area of Guyana.

Jan. 25—An army official says Venezuelan soldiers captured 5 guerrillas headed toward Caracas to buy medical supplies for their comrades operating along the Colombian border.

## VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See also *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

Jan. 12—The North Vietnamese press agency broadcasts a statement sent to Sweden agreeing to accept Sweden's invitation to set up diplomatic ties.

## VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

## YEMEN

Jan. 12—The Sana radio announces that the road from Sana to Taiz, closed almost 15 months by Yemeni royalists, is now open.

## YUGOSLAVIA

Jan. 20—Dr. Bozidar Linhart, deputy general manager of the Yugoslav Bank for Foreign Trade, addresses a meeting of the American Management Association. He invites U.S. companies to invest in Yugoslavia.

## ZAMBIA

Jan. 22—The African National Congress loses its position as the official Opposition in Zambia's Parliament. According to Robinson Nabulyato, the Speaker, the party does not have enough seats (23) to form a quorum in the 110-member House. However, the Congress party was recognized as the Opposition in a previous Parliament of 80 seats of which it controlled 10.

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